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ARTICLE III AND THE POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE
Scott Dodson
ABSTRACT—Courts and commentators have often sourced the political
question doctrine in Article III, a repository of other separation-of-powers
doctrines applicable to the federal courts. Rucho v. Common Cause, a
blockbuster political question case decided in 2019, explicitly tied the
doctrine to Article III. But the historical development of the doctrine
undermines the depth of that connection. Further, sourcing the doctrine in
Article III leads to some very odd effects, including leaving state courts free
to answer federal political questions. This Article argues that the source of
the political question doctrine is in substantive law, not in Article III. Such
an orientation helps explain a number of puzzling attributes of the doctrine,
including why federal courts retain jurisdiction over political question cases,
why state courts must follow the federal political question doctrine, and why
some political questions can be delegated back to the courts. Refocusing the
political question doctrine on substantive law, rather than on Article III,
helps better allocate power among federal courts, state courts, and political
branches.
AUTHOR—James Edgar Hervey Chair in Litigation, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.
Distinguished Professor of Law, and Director of the Center for Litigation
and Courts, UC Hastings Law. I thank those who shared reactions on early
drafts, especially Tara Grove, Craig Konnoth, Mike Parsons, Zach Price,
Adam Steinman, Alexander Tsesis, and Rivka Weill. This paper was selected
for presentation at the 2021 ACS Constitutional Law Scholars Forum, the
2020 Loyola Constitutional Law Conference, and the Federal Courts
Workshop at the 2020 SEALS Conference, and I am grateful for reactions I
received at those events. It was also presented at the UC Hastings Law 1010 Workshop and a 2021 AALS Conference panel on federal courts, and I
thank those who offered very helpful comments there.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal courts must dismiss a case—or decline to resolve an issue—
presenting a “nonjusticiable political question.” 1 Though the doctrine has
historical roots,2 the modern incarnation of the political question doctrine
was cast by Baker v. Carr, which famously articulated a six-factor test for
determining whether a case involves a political question. 3 The first two
factors remain prominent: “a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department” and “a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the issue].”4
In all post-Baker cases finding nonjusticiability, at least one of these two
factors is present.5
Baker called the political question doctrine “primarily a function of the
separation of powers” 6 but did not purport to source the doctrine in any
particular provision of the Constitution. Article III, a repository of other
separation-of-powers doctrines applicable to the federal judiciary, makes

1

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019).
See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
3 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found[:] [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; [2] or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; [3] or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; [4] or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; [5] or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; [6] or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”).
4 Id.
5 See infra Part II.
6 Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.
2
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some sense,7 and since Baker, both courts and commentators have rooted the
political question doctrine in Article III’s delegation to the federal courts of
limited “judicial” power over only “cases” and “controversies.”8
But a close read of the cases developing the political question doctrine
casts serious doubt on a firm Article III source. Some opinions do, indeed,
refer to Article III. Yet others speak to an unmoored value of separation of
powers. Still others cast the political question doctrine as a merits question
rather than a jurisdictional question.9
In addition to lacking firm support in the caselaw, sourcing the doctrine
in Article III has had some very strange consequences. For one, an Article
III source cannot explain why the Court has retained at least some authority
to decide political questions in extreme cases. If Article III prevents federal
courts from resolving a political question, then Article III should prevent
federal courts from resolving the question no matter the circumstances. Yet
the Court has hinted that it retains some authority to answer such questions.10
Additionally, an Article III-based doctrine leaves an unsettling role for
state courts. Because Article III’s limitations do not apply to state courts,11 a
political question doctrine derived from Article III would allow state courts
to adjudicate important constitutional issues that federal courts could not
examine. How odd would it be to learn that while the political question
doctrine prevents the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing the propriety of
an impeachment trial of the President of the United States, the doctrine does
not bar a state judge—perhaps from a state whose population and
government officials strongly support the President—from doing so? Yet
justices have endorsed the theory driving that result.12
I argue that Article III is not the source of the political question doctrine.
Although application of the doctrine might have Article III implications, the
primary source of the federal political question doctrine resides in the
substantive law governing the question. Thus, review of a federal
impeachment, for example, is a political question not because of Article III
but because of the Impeachments Clause itself. This reorientation of the
7 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“The doctrines of mootness,
ripeness, and political question all originate in Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language, no less than
standing does.”).
8 See infra Part I.
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Section III.A.
11 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often that the
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts . . . .”).
12 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1005 n.2 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger,
C.J., Stewart & Stevens, JJ., concurring) (“This Court, of course, may not prohibit state courts from
deciding political questions . . . .”).
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political question doctrine has several important ramifications that resolve
many of the tensions associated with sourcing the doctrine in Article III.13
First, because Article III is not the source of the political question
doctrine, federal courts retain jurisdiction over cases presenting political
questions. Indeed, if the political question can be avoided or has already been
answered by the appropriate decision-maker, then a federal court can decide
a case presenting a political question on the merits. If the answer to an
unanswered political question is a necessary condition to maintaining a claim
or defense, then the federal court should stay the case until receiving an
answer, dismiss the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, or strike the defense.
Second, because substantive federal law binds state courts under the
Supremacy Clause, a substantive-law delegation of adjudicatory authority to
a nonjudicial decision-maker under Baker Factor 1 must be binding on state
courts as well. For example, because the Impeachments Clause grants the
Senate “sole” power to “try” federal impeachments,14 state courts have no
more authority to “try” a federal impeachment than federal courts. However,
if the political question arises only because of Factor 2—because the
substantive law requires application of standards inappropriate for a federal
court—a state court potentially could decide a political question even though
a federal court could not. Although such asymmetry between state and
federal courts poses problems generally, those problems are decidedly less
forceful in the context of partisan gerrymandering, the only pure Factor 2
political question presently recognized.
Third, because political questions do not deprive courts of jurisdiction,
courts retain authority to decide matters peripheral to the political question
even if they cannot answer the political question. Peripheral matters include
determining which decision-maker has constitutional authority under the
substantive law to answer a political question and issuing orders protecting
that decision-maker’s authority when a different putative decision-maker
attempts to usurp that authority. If, for example, the President attempted
unilaterally to declare war, the political question doctrine would not stop the
judiciary from holding the presidential declaration unlawful because the
Declare War Clause gives that power solely to Congress.15
Fourth, even if one substantive law makes an issue a political question,
other substantive laws could grant judicial authority over the same subject.
For example, although the Impeachments Clause prevents a federal court

13
14
15

684

These ramifications are discussed in infra Sections IV.B.1–IV.B.6.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.

116:681 (2021)

Article III and the Political Question Doctrine

from trying an impeachment, 16 the Due Process Clause 17 might permit a
federal court (or a state court) to exercise interpretive and adjudicatory
authority over whether the Senate’s trial comported with the Fifth
Amendment.18 A substantive-law focus on political questions, rather than an
Article III focus, thus gives federal courts a limited role in some political
question cases and helps explain why a challenge to a particular redistricting
plan can be nonjusticiable under the Guarantee Clause but justiciable under
the Equal Protection Clause.
Fifth, if the substantive law allocates adjudicatory authority to a
particular decision-maker under a Baker Factor 1 political question, that
decision-maker could, if consistent with the nondelegation doctrine, delegate
that adjudicatory authority to a different decision-maker, including,
potentially, a federal court. Thus, the federal courts—and state courts—could
exercise adjudicatory authority over a Factor 1 political question under a
delegation from the original decision-maker. Orienting the doctrine around
substantive law helps explain why the Court has suggested that federal courts
can hear cases under legislation to enforce the Guarantee Clause.
Sixth, a substantive-law focus harmonizes the federal political question
doctrine with state political question doctrines. A state constitution that
commits interpretive or adjudicatory authority of a provision to, say, the state
governor might give rise to a political question in state court under state law.
If so, then federal courts hearing the same claim would be required to reach
the same result under vertical choice-of-law principles rather than looking to
Article III. In the end, reorienting the political question doctrine away from
Article III and toward substantive law creates a more sensible and workable
doctrine.
This Article begins, in Part I, by setting out the contours of the modern
political question doctrine and establishing its purported moorings in Article
III. Part II details the development of the federal political question doctrine
and reveals that, in contrast to current understandings of the doctrine, the
political question doctrine has only a tenuous connection to Article III. Part
III exposes two oddities of sourcing the political question doctrine in Article
III. First, the doctrine reserves some federal judicial authority to police the
outer bounds of otherwise nonjusticiable constitutional violations, a result
inconsistent with a lack of Article III power. Second, an Article III source
would, troublingly, allow state courts to adjudicate some federal political
questions that federal courts could not. Part IV reorients the political question

16
17
18

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
Id. amend. V.
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doctrine around substantive law rather than Article III and explains how this
reorientation has important effects—some reassuring, some surprising, and
others disruptive—on existing doctrine and on the authority of state courts.
The final picture is of a recalibrated political question doctrine, largely
outside of Article III, that allocates decision-making authority more sensibly
among nonjudicial actors, federal courts, and state courts.
I.

THE MODERN POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND ARTICLE III

This Part describes the theory and scope of the modern political
question doctrine and shows its purported connection to Article III.
The political question doctrine holds that some issues cannot be
appropriately resolved by the federal courts and instead must be delegated to
the political branches of the government. This doctrine “is primarily a
function of the separation of powers.”19 As Justice Felix Frankfurter once put
it, the political question doctrine helps courts avoid the “political thicket” by
recognizing that the Constitution leaves “the performance of many duties in
our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and
legislative action.” 20 Or, as more recent commentary has put it, “[t]he
political question doctrine reflects a constitutional design that does not
require the judiciary to supply the substantive content of all the
Constitution’s provisions” but instead directs that “some questions rest
within the absolute discretion of the political branches.”21
The political question doctrine thus furthers the goal of “assign[ing] the
most politically controversial matters to those who are charged with making
these difficult policy decisions.” 22 That goal finds justification in the
republican ideal that elected officials make certain policy judgments for the
nation, in the practical reality that the federal courts are ill-equipped to do
so, and in the preservation mindset that the legitimacy of the federal courts
depends upon their role as neutral adjudicators rather than political
policymakers.23

19

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
21 Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and
the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 239 (2002); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The
Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1909 (2015) (“[T]he political
question doctrine instructs that the courts may not decide certain issues . . . . because that constitutional
question is ‘committed’ to another branch.”).
22 Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Political Question Doctrine in State Constitutional Law, 43 RUTGERS
L.J. 573, 574 (2013).
23 See Barkow, supra note 21, at 240, 301 (articulating courts’ institutional limitations); Samuel
Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 638 (2001) (exploring the use of the political
question doctrine in protecting the Court’s legitimacy).
20
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This goal collides with the “virtually unflagging” obligation of the
federal courts to adjudicate questions properly before them.24 The tension
between judicial power and judicial restraint, exacerbated by the
Constitution’s lack of clear guidance for resolving that tension,25 has led to
great debates about the scope and propriety of the political question doctrine.
At one extreme, the late Professor Alexander Bickel urged the Court to
readily use the doctrine for expediency or to preserve institutional
legitimacy, 26 while, at the other, Professor Martin Redish believes it
unconstitutional for the Supreme Court to abdicate its duty of judicial
review. 27 In the middle, the late Professor Herbert Wechsler thought the
doctrine should apply only when the Constitution expressly committed an
adjudicatory decision to a body other than the federal courts.28 Meanwhile,
Professor Rachel Barkow sees the doctrine as a broad “spectrum of
deference” owed by the federal courts to the political branches’
interpretations of the Constitution.29 And Professor Louis Henkin questioned
whether there is such a thing as a single, coherent political question
doctrine.30 It is fair to say that the political question doctrine is ill-defined,
unsettled, and contentious.
Part of the difficulty arises from the challenge of sourcing the political
question doctrine. Such a broad and powerful doctrine demands
constitutional grounding, and looking to Article III is consonant with other
limits on judicial power: standing, mootness, ripeness, and the prohibition
on advisory opinions.31 Some Founding Era evidence supports an Article III
connection—during the Convention, James Madison argued that Article III’s
grant of judicial power was meant to be “limited to cases of a Judiciary

24

Colo. River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363,
1364 (1973) (calling the text of Article III’s description of judicial power “spare and unhelpful”); Adrian
Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311, 1335 (1999) (“[Article III] says nothing about the
procedures by which courts vested with the judicial power must or may consider and decide cases.”); see
also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 340 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring the case-or-controversy
requirement an “ultimate circularity”).
26 Alexander Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46 (1961).
27 Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1060
(1985).
28 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–9
(1959).
29 Barkow, supra note 21, at 319–20.
30 Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 622–23 (1976).
31 For opinions tying the political question doctrine to Article III doctrines, see infra notes 35–42.
25
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Nature.” 32 Although other contemporaneous evidence is sparse, 33 scholars
have concluded that the Framers intended for the judicial power in Article
III to encapsulate only matters “appropriate for judicial resolution,” 34
especially as contrasted with “political” questions.
It is no surprise, then, that courts and many commentators have rooted
the political question doctrine in Article III. The Supreme Court itself has
done so numerous times since the 1960s:
•

•
•

•
•

32

“Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression to
th[e] dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-andcontroversy doctrine. . . . Thus, no justiciable controversy is
presented when the parties seek adjudication of only a political
question.”35
Resolution of political questions is “inconsistent with the
judicial function under Art. III.”36
“[T]he concept of justiciability, which expresses the
jurisdictional limitations imposed upon federal courts by the
‘case or controversy’ requirement of Art. III, embodies both the
standing and political question doctrines upon which
petitioners in part rely. . . . [T]he presence of a political
question suffices to prevent the power of the federal judiciary
from being invoked by the complaining party.”37
The political question doctrine is one “of the doctrines that
cluster about Article III.”38
“The doctrines of mootness, ripeness, and political question all
originate in Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language, no
less than standing does.”39

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(statement of James Madison). The Supreme Court has linked Madison’s characterization to Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006).
33 See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 231 (1990) (“The records of the
Constitutional Convention contain virtually no discussion of the subject, with the sole exception of James
Madison’s observation . . . .”). Somewhat differently, Alexander Hamilton implied that the Constitution
committed some interpretive questions to branches other than the federal courts. THE FEDERALIST NO.
78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“If it be said that the legislative body are
themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers and that the construction they put upon them is
conclusive upon the other departments it may be answered that this cannot be the natural presumption
where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution.” (emphasis added)).
34 Ann Woolhander & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 400 (1995); see also
STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES 60–61 (1997)
(arguing that the Framers expected that federal courts would “act in the usual fashion of courts”).
35 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
36 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972).
37 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974).
38 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
39 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006).
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“Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction
to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ Those two words confine the
business of federal courts to questions presented . . . in a form
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial
process. It is therefore familiar learning that no justiciable
‘controversy’ exists when parties seek adjudication of a
political question.”40
Article III’s limitation of the judicial power to cases and
controversies “mean[s] that federal courts can address only
questions historically viewed as capable of resolution through
the judicial process,” and if a case presents questions that
involve no “judicially enforceable rights,” then “the claim is
said to present a political question and to be nonjusticiable—
outside the courts’ competence and therefore beyond the
courts’ jurisdiction.”41

Justices in nonmajority opinions of the Court have articulated similar
sentiments.42
Several courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court’s lead.
According to the Fifth Circuit, “The justiciability doctrines of standing,
mootness, political question, and ripeness all originate in Article III’s ‘case’
or ‘controversy’ language.”43 In the Eleventh Circuit, a political question is
“not a ‘case or controversy’ as defined by Article III.”44 The D.C. Circuit
said, “The political question doctrine concerns the jurisdictional ‘case or
controversy requirement’ of Article III of the Constitution.”45 Many other
lower courts link the political question doctrine to Article III.46

40 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (citation and some internal quotation marks
omitted).
41 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2493–94 (2019) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
42 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 202 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (opining
that the doctrine recognizes “the limits that Article III imposes upon courts”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 302–03 (2004) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (characterizing political questions as “beyond our
Article III authority to adjudicate”).
43 Choice Inc. of Tex. v. Greenstein, 691 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 2012).
44 Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2009).
45 Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
46 See, e.g., Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (linking the doctrine to Article
III jurisdiction); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Mattis, 868 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that,
like other Article III doctrines, “the presence of a political question likewise deprives this court of
jurisdiction”); Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938, 948–49 (5th Cir. 2011)
(tying the political question doctrine to Article III jurisdiction); cf. John Harrison, The Political Question
Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 512–13 (2017) (noting “a substantial number” of courts tying the
political question doctrine to Article III).
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Prominent commentators have also sourced the political question
doctrine in Article III. As Professor Tara Grove has documented, many
commentators and most of the leading casebooks and treatises covering the
doctrine in the wake of Baker considered the doctrine to be grounded in
Article III. 47 More recently, Professor Rachel Barkow, in her important
exegesis of the doctrine, stated: “The political question doctrine establishes
the boundaries of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction by identifying those
constitutional questions that are beyond the scope of a judicial ‘case’ or
‘controversy.’” 48 A few voices—namely Professor John Harrison and the
venerable Wright & Miller treatise—have taken the opposite view by arguing
that the doctrine has no basis in Article III,49 but they advanced that position
prior to Rucho v. Common Cause, in which the Court expressly held the
political question doctrine to be tethered to Article III.50 As I aim to show
below, everyone has it wrong: Article III plays a role, but not as the
doctrine’s source.
II. THE DOCTRINE’S DEVELOPMENT
I begin with a close look, informed by recent historical scholarship,51 at
how the cases developing the political question doctrine and culminating in
47 Grove, supra note 21, at 1948–54 (reporting on the scholarly treatment). Some debate focused on
the Court’s “passive virtues” rather than interrogating the doctrine’s connection to Article III. See Bickel,
supra note 26, at 46; Wechsler, supra note 28, at 7–9. Professor Louis Henkin, writing in 1976, thought
the doctrine was “an unnecessary, descriptive packaging of several established doctrines” that largely fell
outside of Article III, but he also was not focused on the doctrine’s constitutional source. See Henkin,
supra note 30, at 622–23. Further, Henkin fought against the Baker taxonomy; he did not consider Factor
2 at all (an omission that would be unreasonable today in light of Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct.
2484, 2502 (2019) (relying on Factor 2)), and he was skeptical of any true Factor 1 cases. Henkin, supra
note 30, at 605 n.26 (arguing that the Court could review the Senate’s impeachment proceedings).
48 Barkow, supra note 21, at 241; see also Note, Political Questions, Public Rights, and Sovereign
Immunity, 130 HARV. L. REV. 732, 742 (2016) (“[T]he political question doctrine also bars Article III
adjudication of the merits.”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
78 (8th ed. 2017) (identifying the political question doctrine as a “case or controversy” doctrine).
49 Harrison, supra note 46, at 486; 13C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD
H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3534.3 (3d ed. 2019) (“Article III categories provide
no meaningful independent support for reasoning about political questions.”); Ron Park, Note, Is the
Political Question Doctrine Jurisdictional or Prudential?, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 255, 258–59 (2016)
(“[T]he political question doctrine . . . springs from separation of powers principles and not Article
III . . . .”); cf. Grove, supra note 21, at 1939 (arguing that the pre-Baker doctrine “neither arose from
Article III, nor was a hard-and-fast jurisdictional rule”). One other pre-Rucho treatise states, without
explanation, that “the political question doctrine is not derived from Article III’s limitation of judicial
power to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.6.2 (5th ed.
2007).
50 139 S. Ct. at 2493–94.
51 See Grove, supra note 21, at 1911 (“I argue that the current political question doctrine does not
have the historical pedigree that scholars attribute to it. In fact, the current doctrine was not created until
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the 2019 decision Rucho v. Common Cause treat its connection to Article III.
Although some cases, such as the ones enumerated above, tie the political
question doctrine to Article III, others do not mention Article III at all, and
still others treat the doctrine as a question of merits rather than jurisdiction.
The cases thus undermine both the characterization of the political question
doctrine as derived from Article III and the argument that the political
question doctrine is completely unconnected to Article III. The cases instead
suggest a more nuanced connection between the political question doctrine
and Article III.
Some commentators identify dictum in Marbury v. Madison as the first
caselaw support for the doctrine52: “The province of the court is, solely, to
decide on the rights of individuals . . . . Questions, in their nature political,
or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can
never be made in this court.” 53 This disjunctive language suggests two
different—though clearly related—categories: questions “submitted to the
executive” and questions that are “in their nature political.”54 Marbury did
not mention Article III in this context, but it is fair to say that Marbury’s
language—“province of the court” and “in their nature political”—harkens
to and contrasts with values of “judicial” power embodied in Article III.55
The concept took deeper root in Luther v. Borden, an antebellum case
arising out of competing claims to the government of Rhode Island.56 When
an insurrection attempted to establish a new state government, the
established government declared martial law and defeated the insurgents.
Afterward, an insurgent sued government officials for trespass in federal
court.57 When the officials declared their actions lawful under martial law,
the plaintiff responded that the government and its martial law were
illegitimate.58 The lower federal court considered evidence on the lawfulness

the mid-twentieth century, when it was employed by the Supreme Court to entrench, rather than to
undermine, its emerging supremacy over constitutional law.”).
52 See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20 (2013) (calling
the case the first to “[i]ntimate[]” the doctrine).
53 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
54 Id. at 170. For historical context of Marbury’s language in light of the circumstances of the case,
see Grove, supra note 21, at 1937–39.
55 Cf. Hon. John Marshall, Speech in the House of Representatives of the United States (Mar. 7,
1800), in 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) app. 3, 17 (1820) (“By extending the judicial power to all cases in law and
equity, the constitution had never been understood to confer on that department any political power
whatever.” (emphasis omitted)).
56 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 2 (1849).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 34–35.
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of the government, subsequently found it to be lawful, and so directed the
jury, which then found for the defendant.59
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered the Guarantee Clause, which
states: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when
the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence.”60 Because
the guarantee is “political in its nature,” the Court reasoned, it “rests with
Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State.” 61
Congress can do so by choosing which Representatives and Senators to
admit to Congress. 62 Congress also can delegate to the President the
obligations to “guarantee” and “protect” by authorizing the President to call
forth the militia to suppress insurrections. 63 According to the Court, the
President’s decision to mobilize the militia to help put down the insurrection
was an assertion by the United States that the old government was lawful and
thus republican in form.64
Because state governmental changes are “a question to be settled by the
political power”—a political question—the Court reasoned, “the courts are
bound to take notice of its decision, and to follow it.” 65 Accordingly, the
Court chastised the lower federal court for taking evidence and
independently determining the government’s lawfulness rather than
deferring to the determination made by the political branches, though the
Court nevertheless affirmed the lower court for reaching the right result on
the merits.66
Luther uses the same “political in nature” terminology as that in
Marbury—terminology that has often referred to matters outside the
“judicial” power of Article III.67 But Luther also focuses on the Guarantee
59

Id. at 38.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. For comprehensive exegeses of the Guarantee Clause, see Deborah Jones
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 2 (1988); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1–7 (1972);
and Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 604–611 (2018).
61 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 43.
64 Id. at 44. Whether the government was lawful under state law was settled by the state courts. Id.
at 39–40.
65 Id. at 47. For the argument that the Guarantee Clause does not present a nonjusticiable political
question, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 849, 851–52 (1994). For the argument that claims that the federal government violated the
Guarantee Clause should be justiciable, see Merritt, supra note 60, at 70–78.
66 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 46–47.
67 See supra text accompanying note 54.
60
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Clause and interprets its reference to the “United States” to mean
“Congress.”68 In applying that language, the Court resolved the case not by
ordering a dismissal for lack of Article III power but rather by affirming on
the merits based on the conclusive actions of Congress and its delegate, the
President. 69 Luther thus blends the political-in-nature justification with a
construction of the Guarantee Clause that allocates decision-making
authority to a nonjudicial branch.
Luther does not disclaim all judicial authority to construe the Guarantee
Clause. 70 The Court stated, in dictum: “Unquestionably a military
government . . . would not be a republican government, and it would be the
duty of Congress to overthrow it.” 71 In subsequent decades, the Court
adjudicated a series of republican-in-form cases on the merits.72
But in 1912, the Court reinterpreted Luther and categorically excluded
the Guarantee Clause from the judicial power in Pacific States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon.73 There, Oregon voters passed, by ballot initiative,
a state constitutional amendment levying a tax on certain businesses.74 When
one such business refused to pay, the state sued for the tax and penalties, and
in its answer, the business defended its lack of payment on the ground that
the tax was unlawful because it was adopted through an initiative process
contrary to the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution. 75 The answer was
demurred, and the state courts sustained the demurrer, holding that the
defense was justiciable but meritless.76

68 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 43. This interpretation is contestable. See Chemerinsky, supra note 65, at 871
(arguing that “United States” includes the federal courts).
69 Grove, supra note 21, at 1927–28.
70 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 45; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (“[P]erhaps
not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political questions.”); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 222 n.48 (1962) (opining that “the judiciary might be able to decide the limits of the
meaning of ‘republican form’”). Arguably, Luther is not about the justiciability of claims under the
Guarantee Clause at all. The question at issue was which government was lawful, not which was
“republican.” However, Luther has been cast as a political question case since at least 1912. See infra text
accompanying notes 73–81. I therefore treat it as part of the political question canon.
71 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 45.
72 See In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461–62 (1891) (rejecting, on the merits, a challenge to a state
statute on the ground that it was adopted in a manner inconsistent with the Guarantee Clause); Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 176 (1875) (holding the denial of women’s suffrage to be consistent
with a republican form of government). Other cases construing the Guarantee Clause include Coyle v.
Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567–68 (1911); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 454 (1905); Kies v.
Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905); and Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897).
73 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912).
74 Id. at 133–35.
75 Id. at 136.
76 State v. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 99 P. 427, 428 (Or. 1909).
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On writ of error, the Supreme Court framed the question as “call[ing]
upon us to decide whether it is the duty of the courts or the province of
Congress to determine when a state has ceased to be republican in form and
to enforce the guaranty of the Constitution on that subject.” 77 The Court,
citing Luther, wrote: “[T]hat question has long since been determined by this
court . . . to be political in character, and therefore not cognizable by the
judicial power, but solely committed by the Constitution to the judgment of
Congress.”78 Whether the initiative procedure rendered the state government
nonrepublican was a question “within the scope of the powers conferred
upon Congress, and not, therefore, within the reach of judicial power.” 79
Unlike Luther, which used Congress’s and the President’s actions to rule on
the merits, Pacific States dismissed the writ for lack of jurisdiction,
presumably under Article III.80 This result allowed the state court decision—
which held on the merits that Oregon’s initiative process was consistent with
the Guarantee Clause—to stand.
Over the next fifty years, the Court used Luther and Pacific States to
expand the political question doctrine into other areas, including Article V’s
amendment process and foreign-relations decisions by the political
branches. 81 Although the expansion was ad hoc and undertheorized, the
Court continued to refer to the twin elements of the doctrine—the contrast
between the political and the judicial and the commitment of authority to
nonjudicial actors—without concretely localizing the doctrine in Article III.
In the 1962 case Baker v. Carr, considered to be the foundation of the
modern political question doctrine,82 the Court purported to synthesize the
77

Pac. States, 223 U.S. at 133.
Id.
79 Id. at 150–51.
80 See id. (“[I]t follows that the case presented is not within our jurisdiction, and the writ of error
must therefore be, and it is, dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”).
81 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939) (plurality opinion) (concluding that the time for
ratification was for Congress to determine and involved nonjudicial criteria); id. at 457–59 (Black, J.,
concurring) (reasoning that Congress has “sole and complete control over the amending process, subject
to no judicial review” and that “[t]he process itself is ‘political’ in its entirety . . . and is not subject to
judicial guidance, control or interference at any point”); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302
(1918) (“The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the
Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—Departments . . . , and the propriety of what may be done in
the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”); Chi. & S. Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (“[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to
foreign policy is political, not judicial.”). In Colegrove v. Green, a plurality would have held challenges
to state electoral districting to be nonjusticiable. 328 U.S. 549, 552, 554 (1946) (plurality opinion).
82 See, e.g., Nat Stern, Don’t Answer That: Revisiting the Political Question Doctrine in State Courts,
21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153, 158 (2018); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 3534 (calling the case “classic”).
Some commentators have argued that Baker dramatically changed the political question doctrine from
78
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previous cases into a more formulaic test for the doctrine’s application.83
Baker involved a claim that the failure of Tennessee to update its
apportionment statute since 1901, despite substantial redistribution of the
state population, violated the Equal Protection Clause by giving some voters
more voting power than others.84 The lower court held that “no claim was
stated upon which relief could be granted” because “the matter is considered
unsuited to judicial inquiry or adjustment” and thus “fail[s] to state a
justiciable cause of action.”85
The Supreme Court reversed. 86 In discussing the political question
doctrine, the Court did not cite to Article III or reference its language
directly. Yet, in a separate section finding jurisdiction, the Court expressly
stated that the claim fell within Article III.87 Instead, the Court located the
political question doctrine in a vague generalization of judicial capacity and
separation of powers. 88 Justiciability, the Court explained, depends upon
“whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach
judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be
judicially molded.”89 Summarizing precedent, the Court formulated a sixfactor test for nonjusticiability:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question. Unless one of these formulations is

one of deference to the political branches’ factual determinations to one of judicial supremacy. See Grove,
supra note 21, at 1911–13, 1962–64.
83 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–217 (1962).
84 Id. at 188–95.
85 Id. at 188, 196.
86 Id. at 237.
87 Id. at 199.
88 Id. at 210 (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of
powers.”).
89 Id. at 198.
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inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question’s presence.90

Applying these factors, the Court found the plaintiffs’ claim under the
Equal Protection Clause justiciable. Under the first Baker factor, the Court
could find “no question decided, or to be decided, by a political branch of
government coequal with this Court.”91 Under Factor 2, “[j]udicial standards
under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar” enough
to make such a challenge judicially cognizable.92 And no other factor favored
nonjusticiability.
Since Baker, the Court has relied almost exclusively on the first two
factors in applying the political question doctrine.93 In applying those factors,
the Court has found nonjusticiable political questions in three contexts—
training the National Guard, Senate impeachment trials, and partisan
gerrymandering 94 —while rejecting the political question doctrine in
challenges to Congress’s power to expel its members and to the
constitutionality of a federal statute allowing Americans born in Jerusalem
to choose to have “Israel” listed on their passport as their place of birth.95 A
brief explanation of each illuminates the modern doctrine’s scope and ties to
Article III.96
In Powell v. McCormack, in 1969, the House of Representatives refused
to seat Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. after finding that he had
embezzled House funds.97 Powell filed suit in federal district court seeking a
declaratory judgment that his exclusion was unlawful because he met the
constitutional qualifications.98 Although the Constitution states that “[e]ach
90 Id. at 217. Dissatisfaction with Baker’s factors abounds. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial
Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis,
80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1175 (2002) (“Baker’s six factors cannot meaningfully distinguish ‘political’
questions from justiciable ‘legal’ ones.”).
91 Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
92 Id.
93 Williams, supra note 60, at 680–81.
94 Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1973) (National Guard); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S.
224, 237–38 (1993) (impeachment); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507–08 (2019) (partisan
gerrymandering).
95 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512–13 (1969) (House expulsion); Zivotofsky v. Clinton,
566 U.S. 189, 194 (2012) (Jerusalem case).
96 In passing, the Court also rejected the political question doctrine in claims challenging Congress’s
plenary authority over American Indian tribes, the assertion of executive privilege in response to a
congressional subpoena, and the President’s authority to disregard a treaty. See County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 248–50 (1985); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692–97
(1974); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 229–30 (1986). None of these cases
sheds useful light on the thesis of this Article.
97 395 U.S. at 492–93.
98 Id. at 489.
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House shall be the Judge of the . . . Qualifications of its own Members,”99
the Supreme Court held that provision to authorize the House to determine
whether the constitutional qualifications are met but not whether other
reasons for expulsion are constitutionally permissible.100
Like Baker, the Court distinguished the doctrine from subject matter
jurisdiction 101 and, without citing Article III, reaffirmed that the political
question doctrine depends upon the constitutional separation of powers.102
Almost all of the Court’s analysis of the political question doctrine—some
twenty-seven pages—focused on the meaning of the Qualifications Clauses
in Article I.103 After concluding that the Qualifications Clauses did not, under
Baker Factor 1, allocate decision-making authority away from the federal
courts on whether the House could unseat a member who satisfied all of the
constitutional qualifications, the Court then summarily rejected application
of the other five Baker factors.104
Gilligan v. Morgan, decided in 1973, involved a lawsuit for violations
of the Due Process Clause based on the alleged negligent training of National
Guard reservists.105 The plaintiffs did not seek damages but rather asked the
district court to “assume continuing regulatory jurisdiction over the activities
of the Ohio National Guard” and to “establish standards for the training, kind
of weapons and scope and kind of orders to control the actions of the
National Guard.”106
The Supreme Court held such remedies inappropriate for federal courts.
The Court relied primarily on Baker Factor 1. 107 The Militia Clause of
Article I vests in Congress the power “[t]o provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia, . . . reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia

99

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
Powell, 395 U.S. at 522; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237 (1993) (“The decision
as to whether a Member satisfied these qualifications was placed with the House, but the decision as to
what these qualifications consisted of was not.”).
101 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1961) (“The distinction between [lack of federal
jurisdiction and nonjusticiability] is significant.”); Powell, 395 U.S. at 512 (“[T]here is a significant
difference between determining whether a federal court has ‘jurisdiction of the subject matter’ and
determining whether a cause over which a court has subject matter jurisdiction is ‘justiciable.’”).
102 Powell, 395 U.S. at 518–19.
103 See id. at 521–47; cf. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 237 (“Our conclusion in Powell was based on the fixed
meaning of ‘[q]ualifications’ set forth in Art. I, § 2.”).
104 Powell, 395 U.S. at 548–49. The Court noted that other provisions—including the Guarantee
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment—might impose qualifications outside of Article I. Id. at 520 n.41.
105 413 U.S. 1, 1 (1973).
106 Id. at 5–6.
107 See Barkow, supra note 21, at 268–70.
100
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according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” 108 As the Court
reasoned:
[T]hat provision is explicit that the Congress shall have the responsibility for
organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia (now the National Guard), with
certain responsibilities being reserved to the respective States. Congress has
enacted appropriate legislation . . . and has also authorized the President—as
the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces—to prescribe regulations
governing organization and discipline of the National Guard. . . . The relief
sought by respondents, requiring initial judicial review and continuing
surveillance by a federal court over the training, weaponry, and orders of the
Guard, would therefore embrace critical areas of responsibility vested by the
Constitution in the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government.109

The Court continued:
It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental
action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches
directly responsible—as the Judicial Branch is not—to the electoral process.
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which
the courts have less competence. . . . The ultimate responsibility for these
decisions is appropriately vested in branches of the government which are
periodically subject to electoral accountability.110

The Court did not rely on Article III or intimate that the political
question doctrine removed the case from Article III “judicial power,” as
Pacific States seemed to have done.111 Instead, the Court ordered the case
dismissed on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted,112 as Baker suggested would be appropriate.113
In Nixon v. United States, decided in 1993, the Court considered
whether the federal courts could review the constitutionality of a Senate
impeachment conviction of a federal judge when the Senate used a
committee to take evidence.114 After his conviction, Walter Nixon sued in
district court for a declaration that his conviction was void on the ground that
the taking of evidence by a committee violated the constitutional direction
that the Senate try impeachments.115

108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 6–7.
Id. at 10.
See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 5.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 196 (1962).
506 U.S. 224, 224 (1993).
Id. at 227–28.
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The Court concluded that, under Factor 1, the Constitution committed
the interpretation of “try” to the Senate because the Senate has the “sole”
power over impeachments.116 The Court relied on Baker Factor 2 to bolster
this conclusion: the vagaries of the word “try” helped convince the Court
that the Constitution meant to leave the definition of that word to the
Senate.117 Together, those features made the question nonjusticiable under
the Impeachments Clause. 118 Two concurrences suggested that extreme
abuses of the Senate’s impeachment power—such as conviction by coin
flip—might warrant judicial review.119 No opinion cited to Article III, and
the Court appears to have resolved the case on nonjurisdictional grounds.120
Zivotofsky v. Clinton presented the issue of whether a federal statute
allowing Americans born in Jerusalem to choose to have “Israel” listed on
their passport as their place of birth unconstitutionally interfered with the
President’s authority over foreign affairs. 121 Zivotofsky was born in
Jerusalem; his parents, American citizens, sued the State Department to have
“Israel” listed on his passport. The lower courts dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction based on the political question doctrine.122
The Supreme Court reversed. It characterized the political question
doctrine as “a narrow exception” to the obligation of a federal court to decide
a case before it. 123 In setting out the contours of the doctrine, the Court
mentioned only Baker Factors 1 and 2.124 Applying these factors, the Court
contrasted the question of whether Jerusalem is part of Israel (perhaps a
116

Id. at 229–33.
Id. at 228–29 (“[T]he lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that
there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”); id. at 230 (concluding that the
word “try” “lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review of the
Senate’s actions”).
118 Id. at 238. The Court also pointed to other factors, including the need for finality of presidential
impeachments and the importance of preserving the Senate’s impeachment check on the judiciary. Id. at
234–36.
119 Id. at 239 (White, J., concurring) (“Even taking a wholly practical approach, I would prefer not
to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction to
‘try’ impeachment cases.”); id. at 253–54 (Souter, J., concurring) (“One can . . . envision different and
unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings. If the
Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a
coin toss . . . .”).
120 The district court held that it did have subject matter jurisdiction but nonetheless dismissed for
lack of justiciability. Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9, 11–12, 14 (D.D.C. 1990). The Supreme
Court affirmed that result, and two justices who would have held the claim justiciable but meritless
concurred in the judgment. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 239 (White, J., concurring). Those circumstances indicate
that the Supreme Court agreed that the political question doctrine warrants a nonjurisdictional dismissal.
121 566 U.S. 189, 191–92 (2012).
122 Id. at 191.
123 Id. at 195.
124 Id.
117
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political question entrusted to the President by Article II) with the legal
question of whether the congressional statute conflicts with the President’s
constitutional powers (an ordinary question for judicial resolution). The
latter question, the Court held, was not a political question.125
The Court’s opinion does not identify the source of the political
question doctrine, but, in concurrence, Justice Sonya Sotomayor explained
her view that the doctrine “recognizes the limits that Article III imposes upon
courts and accords appropriate respect to the other branches’ exercise of their
own constitutional powers.” 126 She then attempted to group the six Baker
factors: Factor 1 is on its own, in that “the court lacks authority” because
“the Constitution itself requires that another branch resolve the question
presented”;127 Factors 2 and 3 “reflect circumstances in which a dispute calls
for decision-making beyond courts’ competence” and thus “beyond the
judicial role envisioned by Article III”;128 and Factors 4 through 6 “address
circumstances in which prudence may counsel against a court’s resolution of
an issue.”129
Rucho v. Common Cause, 130 decided in 2019, considered whether
partisan gerrymandering—drawing voting districts with imbalances among
the major political parties—presented nonjusticiable political questions.131
The Constitution provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”132 But
state authority to set districts for elections, even absent congressional
legislation, is not unfettered. States cannot, for example, set districts that
violate the Equal Protection Clause.133
The Court has acknowledged that some (but not all) partisan
gerrymandering could be unconstitutional134 but, prior to Rucho, twice failed

125

Id. at 196.
Id. at 202 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
127 Id. at 203.
128 Id. at 203–04.
129 Id. at 204.
130 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
131 For an extensive treatment of partisan gerrymandering, see ERIK J. ENGSTROM, PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2013).
132 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
133 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
134 See Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015) (stating
that partisan gerrymanders violate democratic principles); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752–54
(1973) (“It would be idle, we think, to contend that any political consideration taken into account in
fashioning a reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate it.” (emphasis added)).
126
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to produce a majority opinion adopting a standard for determining
unconstitutionality. 135 Rucho held that the task of setting standards was
beyond the Court’s capacity, and thus, partisan-gerrymandering claims are
nonjusticiable political questions.136
Rucho resolved two appeals. One involved a Republican redistricting
plan in North Carolina; the other, a Democratic plan in Maryland. 137 The
evidence overwhelmingly proved that each party in power had drawn district
lines intentionally, and nearly exclusively, for the purpose of maximizing the
elected number of its party’s candidates; the redistricting plans in each state
passed on party-line votes in the state legislatures.138 Federal district courts
struck down both states’ redistricting plans on the basis of the First
Amendment, and the court hearing the North Carolina case also found
violations of the Equal Protection Clause and Article I.139
On appeal, the Supreme Court directly tied the political question
doctrine to Article III. Article III, the Court said, has been understood “to
mean that federal courts can address only questions historically viewed as
capable of resolution through the judicial process.” 140 If a case presents
questions that involve no “judicially enforceable rights” or “that lack
judicially discoverable and manageable standards,” the Court explained,
then “the claim is said to present a ‘political question’ and to be
nonjusticiable—outside the courts’ competence and therefore beyond the
courts’ jurisdiction.”141 In contrast with other post-Baker cases, Rucho thus
defines a political question as being outside the jurisdiction granted to federal
courts by Article III.
Importantly, the Court disclaimed reliance on Baker Factor 1. After all,
the Court previously had exercised authority to review the constitutionality
of gerrymandered districts in vote-dilution and race-discrimination cases, so
what made partisan gerrymanders political questions was not some textual
commitment of congressional districting to a coordinate branch.142 Instead,
the Court held, partisan-gerrymandering claims, unlike racial135 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 (2004) (plurality opinion); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 113 (1986).
136 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019).
137 Id. at 2491–93.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 2492–93.
140 Id. at 2493–94 (internal quotation marks omitted).
141 Id. at 2494 (some internal quotation marks omitted).
142 Id. at 2495–96 (rejecting the argument that “the Framers set aside electoral issues such as the one
before us as questions that only Congress can resolve” by stating “[w]e do not agree” and by pointing to
cases holding “that there is a role for the courts with respect to at least some issues that could arise from
a State’s drawing of congressional districts”).

701

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

gerrymandering claims or one-person-one-vote claims, lack judicially
manageable standards for resolution under Baker Factor 2 because
distinguishing constitutional from unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders
would require standards that are “political, not legal” and that therefore are
“beyond the competence of the federal courts.”143 The Court concluded:
Federal judges have no license to reallocate political power between the two
major political parties, with no plausible grant of authority in the Constitution,
and no legal standards to limit and direct their decisions. Judicial action must
be governed by standard, by rule, and must be principled, rational, and based
upon reasoned distinctions found in the Constitution or laws. Judicial review of
partisan gerrymandering does not meet those basic requirements. 144

The Court therefore vacated the district courts’ judgments and “remanded
with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.”145
*

*

*

These cases reveal an unsettled relationship between the political
question doctrine and Article III. The Court has alternatively grounded the
doctrine in Article III (expressly in Rucho and effectively in Pacific States),
distinguished the doctrine from Article III (Powell, Baker), and ignored
Article III (Nixon, Gilligan, Zivotofsky, Luther). The cases thus suggest that
uncovering the source of the political question doctrine demands deeper
analysis.
III. THE ODDITIES OF AN ARTICLE III SOURCE
In addition to its ambivalent historical pedigree, sourcing the political
question doctrine in Article III causes two oddities. First, an Article III
source is inconsistent both with the Court’s resolution of some political
question cases as merits-based dismissals and with the Court’s reservation
of authority to police the outer bounds of otherwise nonjusticiable
constitutional violations. Second, an Article III source leaves anomalous
space for state courts to adjudicate constitutional political questions that
federal courts could not.

143

Id. at 2500.
Id. at 2507 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278
(2004) (plurality opinion)).
145 Id. at 2508.
144

702

116:681 (2021)

Article III and the Political Question Doctrine

A. Dismissals and Reservation of Authority
Lack of Article III authority typically results in a jurisdictional
dismissal. 146 Without Article III jurisdiction, the Court has intoned, “the
court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the
law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is
that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” 147 So important is
Article III that a court cannot dismiss on the merits without first assuring
itself of jurisdiction.148
If Article III is the source of the political question doctrine, then
political question dismissals must be for lack of jurisdiction. The Court in
two political question cases—Rucho and Pacific States—did indeed dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction.149 But the Court characterized political questions as
nonjurisdictional in others. Luther held a question under the Guarantee
Clause to be committed to Congress but then applied Congress’s answer to
affirm the lower court’s judgment on the merits. 150 Baker specifically
distinguished subject matter jurisdiction from nonjusticiability, which it
characterized, using merits terminology, as a failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. 151 So did Powell. 152 Gilligan, after finding a
political question under the Militia Clause, dismissed on the merits under
Rule 12(b)(6). 153 Nixon appears to have deemed a dismissal for
nonjusticiability to be a nonjurisdictional dismissal. 154 If the political
question doctrine divests a federal court of Article III authority, then these
political question cases ordered the wrong remedy.
Another feature of political question cases that undermines the
doctrine’s connection to Article III is the Court’s insistence that federal
courts do have power to decide some political questions in extreme cases.
Without Article III judicial power to decide a question, a federal court should
lack power to decide the question no matter how extreme the
circumstances.155 But that is not how the Court has approached the political
question doctrine. To the contrary, the Court has often reserved authority to
decide political questions under extreme circumstances.
146

See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–89, 109–10 (1998).
Id. at 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869)).
148 See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007).
149 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508; Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912).
150 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 46–47 (1849).
151 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 200–01 (1962).
152 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512 (1969).
153 Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1973).
154 See supra note 120.
155 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (denying the power to
decide a cause of action without Article III jurisdiction).
147
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For example, although the Court has often stated that Guarantee Clause
claims present political questions, the Court has also decided some
Guarantee Clause claims on their merits and has suggested that whether the
Court will decide a Guarantee Clause claim depends upon the
circumstances.156 Similarly, in Nixon, although the Court held the question
of whether the Senate could use a committee to take impeachment evidence
to be nonjusticiable,157 the two concurrences suggested that extreme abuses
of the Senate’s impeachment power could warrant judicial review. 158
Retaining the authority to exercise judicial review in extreme cases otherwise
outside of Article III is inconsistent with the way Article III generally
works. 159 The Court’s insistence that it retains authority to decide some
political questions, along with the Court’s dispositions of some political
question cases on nonjurisdictional grounds, belie the idea that the political
question doctrine is an expression of the limits of judicial power under
Article III.
B. Political Question Doctrine Asymmetry
An Article III-sourced political question doctrine leaves room for state
courts to answer political questions that the federal courts cannot. This
Section describes this asymmetry between state and federal courts and its
discomforts.
1. State Court–Federal Court Asymmetry
Article III establishes a defined role for the federal courts in the federal
system by restricting federal courts to exercising “judicial” power over
specified “cases” and “controversies.”160 These limits do not apply to state
courts.161 The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that state courts are
bound neither by Article III justiciability limits—even when they adjudicate

156

See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229–31 (1993).
158 Id. at 239 (White, J., concurring); id. at 253–54 (Souter, J., concurring).
159 Cf. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019) (“[T]he dissent essentially embraces
the argument that . . . ‘this Court can address the problem of partisan gerrymandering because it must.’
That is not the test of our authority under the Constitution; that document instead ‘confines the federal
courts to a properly judicial role.’” (citation omitted)).
160 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
161 See 16B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 4015 (“As matters stand, state courts may determine
federal constitutional questions even though Supreme Court review is blocked on such justiciability
grounds as lack of standing, mootness, or political question doctrine.” (footnotes omitted)).
157
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questions of federal law162—nor by federal notions of separation of powers.163
The federal political question doctrine, if grounded in Article III, then also
should not bind state courts.164 An Article III source for the political question
doctrine creates a potential asymmetry between the scope of federal judicial
power and the scope of state judicial power to adjudicate questions of federal
law.
Of course, states could adopt for their courts the same limits that Article
III imposes on federal courts. But many do not.165 State constitutions are,
generally speaking, documents of default authorization; state courts, unlike
federal courts, have all powers not prohibited to them by their
constitutions. 166 To the extent a state constitution even has a section
analogous to Article III,167 the state constitutional language usually differs
from that of Article III in ways that broaden the scope of state judicial
power.168

162 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints of Article III do not
apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or
controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they address issues of federal law . . . .”);
N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1988) (“[T]he special limitations that
Article III of the Constitution imposes on the jurisdiction of the federal courts are not binding on the state
courts. The States are thus left free . . . to determine matters that would not satisfy the more stringent
requirement in the federal courts that an actual ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ be presented for resolution.”
(citation omitted)).
163 See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902) (“Whether the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections of
persons belonging to one department may . . . exert powers which . . . pertain to another department of
government, is for the determination of the State.”).
164 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1005 n.2 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“This Court,
of course, may not prohibit state courts from deciding political questions, any more than it may prohibit
them from deciding questions that are moot . . . .”). State and territorial courts tend to agree that the
federal political question doctrine does not bind them. See, e.g., Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp.,
848 N.W.2d 58, 91 (Iowa 2014) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has made clear that the federal
political question doctrine does not apply to state courts.”); Bryan v. Fawkes, 61 V.I. 201, 218 n.6 (2014)
(similar); State v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist., 32 P.3d 325, 334 (Wyo. 2001) (similar). But see Huddleston
v. Sawyer, 932 P.2d 1145, 1158–59 (Or. 1997) (holding that because the federal political question
doctrine decisions are federal law, they are binding on state courts).
165 See 1 STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 6.2 n.3 (2018)
(collecting cases). The states depart considerably from the Article III standing doctrine. See, e.g., Provo
City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989) (“[T]he federal rules on standing, as such, are not
binding on state courts, and the article III constitutional restrictions . . . are not necessarily relevant to the
development of the standing rules that apply in Utah’s state courts.”).
166 See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1887–88 (2001).
167 Some do not. E.g., Keller v. Flaherty, 600 N.E.2d 736, 738 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (“Ohio has no
constitutional counterpart to Section 2, Article III . . . .”).
168 See G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND
NATION 43 (1988).
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Most state constitutions, for example, lack a case-or-controversy
requirement. 169 While Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement bars
federal courts from issuing advisory opinions, 170 many states authorize or
even require their state courts to issue advisory opinions.171 Massachusetts
courts have issued advisory opinions since at least 1781.172 Other courts have
issued advisory opinions even without express authority to do so.173 And state
court advisory opinions are not restricted to questions of state law; to the
contrary, state courts have routinely issued advisory opinions on questions
of federal law.174
Similarly, state courts usually employ more relaxed standing
requirements than federal courts. 175 Some have virtually no standing

169 See Thomas B. Bennett, The Paradox of Exclusive State-Court Jurisdiction over Federal Claims,
105 MINN. L. REV. 1211, 1231 (2021) (“No state constitution imposes the ‘case or controversy’
requirement that the federal Constitution does.”); Hershkoff, supra note 166, at 1879–80 (making the
same observation); see also Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm’n, 623 P.2d 431, 438 (Haw. 1981)
(“[T]he courts of Hawaii are not subject to a ‘cases or controversies’ limitation like that imposed upon
the federal judiciary by Article III . . . .”).
170 See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 446 (1993); James B.
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129,
153 (1893). The prohibition on advisory opinions stems from Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410
n.*(a) (1791), and refusal of the Court to answer questions posed by President George Washington’s
Cabinet. See Letter from John Jay, C.J., U.S. Sup. Ct., and Associate Justices, U.S. Sup. Ct., to George
Washington, President of the United States (July 20, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC
PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 487, 487–88 (H. Johnson ed., New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1891); Letter from
John Jay, C.J., U.S. Sup. Ct., and Associate Justices, U.S. Sup. Ct., to George Washington, President of
the United States (Aug., 8, 1793), in THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, supra, at
488, 488–89.
171 See Hershkoff, supra note 166, at 1845–46; MEL A. TOPF, A DOUBTFUL AND PERILOUS
EXPERIMENT 17–27, 187–89 (2011). A recent high-profile example is Advisory Opinion to the Governor
re: Implementation of Amendment 4, the Voting Restoration Amendment, SC19-1341 (Fla. Jan. 16, 2020)
(advising the Governor on the meaning of the state constitutional amendment extending voting rights to
felons who complete “all terms of sentence” as applied to financial obligations like fines and restitution).
172 See OPINIONS OF THE JUSTICES TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, in 126 Mass.
547, 548 (Supp. 1880) (reporting advisory opinions from justices given on February 22, 1781).
173 See Scheibel v. Pavlak, 282 N.W.2d 843, 851 (Minn. 1979) (issuing an advisory opinion to the
Minnesota House of Representatives despite lacking jurisdiction).
174 See William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication
of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 269 n.27 (1990) (citing cases); cf. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ.,
342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (“We do not undertake to say that a state court may not render an opinion on a
federal constitutional question even under such circumstances that it can be regarded only as advisory.”).
175 See generally Bennett, supra note 169, at 1232–33 & fig.1 (reporting a “kaleidoscope of state
standing rules”); Hershkoff, supra note 166, at 1836–37 (reporting that state courts have issued advisory
opinions, granted taxpayers standing, and decided moot cases); Wyatt Sassman, A Survey of
Constitutional Standing in State Courts, 8 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RES. L. 349, 349 (2016)
(surveying the standing law of all fifty states).
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requirements at all. 176 In Michigan, application of federal standing
requirements might even violate the Michigan constitution. 177 These
expansive exercises of judicial power—beyond the Article III confines
applicable to federal court—authorize state court jurisdiction even when
deciding questions of federal law.178
With regard to state political question doctrines specifically, some
states have adopted the federal standard for themselves as a matter of state
law.179 Those adoptions likely stem from the gravitational force that federal
law, especially as interpreted by the Supreme Court, exerts on the
interpretation of state law, such that state doctrines often mirror their federal
counterparts even in nonpreemptive areas such as Article III.180
Other states, however, have resisted that pull and developed distinctive
political question doctrines. 181 Differentiation from the federal doctrine
makes sense in light of the more active role state courts have traditionally

176 E.g., Lansing Sch. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 692, 699 (Mich. 2010) (“[A]
litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action.”); Ohio Acad. of Trial Laws. v. Sheward,
715 N.E.2d 1062, 1081–82 (Ohio 1999) (“State courts need not become enmeshed in the federal
complexities and technicalities involving standing and are free to reject procedural frustrations in favor
of just and expeditious determination on the ultimate merits.”).
177 Lansing Sch. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d at 693–94 & n.9.
178 See generally Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 1257 (2011)
(discussing this problem in the context of standing and proposing the restoration of “the understanding of
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction that was held by the founding generation: namely, that it
extends to review of all state court determinations of federal law that are adverse to the claimed federal
right”).
179 E.g., Kan. Bldg. Indus. Workers Comp. Fund v. State, 359 P.3d 33, 43 (Kan. 2015) (discussing
the state court’s application of “the political question doctrine through Baker’s lens”). For catalogues of
state political question doctrines, see Stern, supra note 82, at 180–88, and Nat Stern, The Political
Question Doctrine in State Courts, 35 S.C. L. REV. 405, 408–12 (1984).
180 See generally Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703,
707–29 (2016) (exploring the widespread phenomenon—pervasive among constitutions, statutes, rules
of court, and judicial decisions—of federal law’s pull on state courts and state lawmakers to emulate
nonpreemptive federal law).
181 E.g., Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 368–72 (Colo. 2009) (en banc) (rejecting the Baker factors
and instead adopting a more expansive scope of judicial review consistent with the role of Colorado courts
in the Colorado system); Backman v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 441 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Mass. 1982)
(rejecting the political question doctrine as inconsistent with the obligation of Massachusetts courts to
adjudicate claims of unconstitutionality). Territorial courts have expressed similar sentiments. See, e.g.,
Bryan v. Fawkes, 61 V.I. 201, 218 n.6 (2014) (“Hansen has provided this Court with no legal argument
as to why this Court should incorporate [the political question doctrine] into Virgin Islands
jurisprudence.”).
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played in policy and politics.182 Because state judges are often elected,183 state
court adjudication is “very much in the close shadow of political choice.”184
State courts have a long history of common law lawmaking that includes
creation, development, and implementation of legal policy in ways that
operate in concert with the other branches of state government and blur the
separation of powers.185 Further, “because state constitutions often include
positive rights and regulatory norms, their texts explicitly engage state courts
in substantive areas that have historically been outside the Article III
domain.”186
And structurally, state constitutions do not generally prescribe as rigid
a separation of powers as the federal Constitution. For many state
constitutions, as former Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Ellen Peters
wrote, “the governing principle is not separation but networking.”187 State
courts are often working partners with the state political branches in setting
and enforcing state regulatory policy. 188 In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., for
example, the Supreme Court adopted an abstention doctrine based in part on
the close connection between state courts and state agencies:

182 Stern, supra note 82, at 180 (“Critics of the lockstep approach to state constitutional law can make
a forceful case that state supreme courts should carve out their own distinctive conceptions of political
questions.”).
183 See Scott Dodson, Accountability and Transparency in U.S. Courts, in ACCOUNTABILITY E
TRANSPARÊNCIA DA JUSTIÇA CIVIL: UMA PERSPECTIVA COMPARADA [ACCOUNTABILITY AND
TRANSPARENCY IN CIVIL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE] 273, 278–80 (Daniel Mitidiero ed.,
2019).
184 Rodriguez, supra note 22, at 576.
185 See Hershkoff, supra note 166, at 1888; Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784
(2002) (“Not only do state-court judges possess the power to ‘make’ common law, but they have the
immense power to shape the States’ constitutions as well.”). For historical accounts, see Hendrik Hartog,
The Public Law of a County Court: Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 20 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 282, 284 (1976), and MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW:
1780–1860, at xii (1977).
186 Hershkoff, supra note 166, at 1889–90; see also Rodriguez, supra note 22, at 585 (“[S]tate
constitutional rules are comparatively more detailed; we can therefore expect courts to find in the
documents more discernible and manageable standards.”).
187 Christine Durham, The Judicial Branch in State Government: Parables of Law, Politics, and
Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1601, 1608–09 (2001) (quoting Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal
Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543, 1561 (1997) (emphasis
omitted)); see also Rodriguez, supra note 22, at 576 (noting that “[s]tate constitutional rules emerge from
distinct, and often vexing, political predicaments” and that “legal decisions, including matters of
constitutional interpretation, are made very much in the close shadow of political choice”). There are
exceptions. See, e.g., Westerfield v. Ward, 599 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Ky. 2019) (noting a “uniquely stringent
separation of powers provision” in the Kentucky state constitution); Bredesen v. Tenn. Jud. Selection
Comm’n, 214 S.W.3d 419, 434 (Tenn. 2007) (same for Tennessee).
188 See Ann Woolhander & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the Administrative States,
87 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 619–20 (1999).
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In describing the relation of the Texas court to the [Texas Railroad]
Commission no useful purpose will be served by attempting to label the court’s
position as legislative or judicial—suffice it to say that the Texas courts are
working partners with the Railroad Commission in the business of creating a
regulatory system for the oil industry. . . . The court may even formulate new
standards for the Commission’s administrative practice and suggest that the
Commission adopt them.189

State courts often perform nonjudicial functions inconsistent with
Article III’s limits on “judicial” power.190 In Tennessee, a council of state
judges appoints the state attorney general.191 Judges in North Carolina can
convene grand juries.192 A reported practice in Virginia is for legislators to
initiate a “friendly” suit testing the constitutionality of controversial
legislation. 193 State courts regulate the bench and bar and participate as
advisers in law-reform efforts. 194 As Justice Christine Durham put it:
“[B]ecause of state court rule-making functions, management and
administrative functions, we have a very regular and quite vigorous and
ongoing relationship with the other branches of state government.”195
These differences in state court practices suggest that some claims
could be justiciable in state court under the relevant state political question
doctrine even though those same claims would be nonjusticiable in federal
court under an Article III-based federal political question doctrine. In
application, states do appear to assert more judicial authority under their
political question doctrines than federal courts would under the federal
doctrine. Some state courts, for example, find judicially manageable
189

319 U.S. 315, 325–26 (1943) (citations omitted).
See Hershkoff, supra note 166, at 1905 (reporting that the practice of state governmental branches
“tends . . . toward blended functions that allow for complementary and overlapping activity by the
different branches and foci of power”); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 169, 208 (1983) (noting “the nonadjudicatory functions of state supreme courts”).
191 See Hershkoff, supra note 166, at 1837.
192 See In re Alamance Cnty. Ct. Facilities, 405 S.W.2d 125, 126 (N.C. 1991).
193 See THOMAS R. MORRIS, THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS 132 (1975).
194 Hershkoff, supra note 166, at 1873 n.214 (“Today many states’ judicial branches participate in
law reform efforts through quasi-bureaucratic processes that are separate from adjudication but
nevertheless accepted as part of the judicial function.”); James P. White, State Supreme Courts as
Regulators of the Legal Procession Part I: Supreme Courts and Legal Education Reform, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1155, 1165 (1997). In a pandemic-fueled 2020, several state supreme courts adopted a
“diploma privilege” exempting 2020 law graduates from having to take the state bar exam as a condition
to being admitted to the bar. See Rachel Stone, Push for Diploma Privilege Unites Law Grads Nationwide,
LAW360 (July 8, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1289972/push-for-diploma-privilege-uniteslaw-grads-nationwide [https://perma.cc/M58K-V6RV].
195 Christine Durham, Justice, Utah Sup. Ct., Remarks on the Influence of International Human
Rights Law on State Courts and State Constitutions at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Mar. 28, 1996) , in 90 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 259, 261 (1996).
190
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standards in state constitutional provisions that seem to defy them, including
requirements that the state provide “quality” or “efficient” public schools196
and the application of the Pennsylvania constitution’s free and equal
elections clause to partisan gerrymandering.197 The Massachusetts high court
has rejected nonjusticiability in hearing a constitutional challenge to the
procedural validity of a state constitutional amendment,198 and other state
courts have held justiciable challenges to state impeachment trials and
questions involving annexation, 199 all of which have nonjusticiable
analogues in federal court.200
Although these cases addressed state law claims, there is no Article III
bar to state court justiciability of analogous federal claims, even if those
claims would be nonjusticiable in federal court. Indeed, several state courts
have adjudicated claims under the Guarantee Clause that would likely be
deemed nonjusticiable in federal court.201 For example, the South Carolina
supreme court recently held that the Guarantee Clause provides “no
independent, federal right . . . prohibiting taxation without representation”
and thus ordered summary judgment entered for the state defendants in a
§ 1983 claim against them.202 The court did not hold the claim nonjusticiable
as a political question, even though it noted that federal courts would tend to
do so.203 Similarly, in 2012, the West Virginia supreme court rejected, on the
merits, an Equal Protection Clause challenge to state electoral districts as an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander,204 akin to the claim that Rucho held
to be nonjusticiable in federal court. 205 An Article III-grounded federal
political question doctrine permits these asymmetrical results.
2. Asymmetry Oddities
This federal–state asymmetry creates a number of oddities. The primary
oddity is that state courts could become the principal judicial forum for
adjudicating important questions of federal law.
196

See Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 260–61 (Mont. 2005);
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212–13 (Ky. 1989).
197 See League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 741 (Pa. 2018) (“While
federal courts have, to date, been unable to settle on a workable standard by which to assess such claims
under the federal Constitution, we find no such barriers under our great Pennsylvania charter.”).
198 See Backman v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 441 N.E.2d 523, 526–27 (Mass. 1982).
199 See Hershkoff, supra note 166, at 1863–66.
200 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993) (federal impeachment); Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939) (federal constitutional amendment).
201 See, e.g., infra notes 220–234 (discussing cases).
202 Campbell v. Hilton Head No. 1 Pub. Serv. Dist., 580 S.E.2d 137, 140 (S.C. 2003).
203 Id. at 140–41, 140 n.7.
204 See State v. Tennant, 730 S.E.2d 368, 390 (W. Va. 2012).
205 See supra note 142.
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This problem has arisen in the analogous context of standing. As Judge
William Fletcher has documented, “state courts have been able to decide
questions of federal law when, under the standards of article III, a litigant
has no standing, or a dispute is moot or unripe.”206 Further, because Article
III limits apply to Supreme Court review of such state court decisions,207
many state court decisions will be unreviewable by the Supreme Court.208
Standing asymmetry has created, in Professor Matthew Hall’s words, “a
jurisdictional gap—a category of cases in which state courts may exercise
jurisdiction over questions of federal law, but the Supreme Court may not
review their decisions on appeal.”209 Taking advantage of this asymmetry,
plaintiffs increasingly resort to state courts in cases presenting Article III
standing problems in federal court.210
Although standing asymmetry certainly has its ills, its prevention of
federal court resolution of the particular legal question is likely to be, in most
cases, limited and temporary. For instance, Article III standing prevents
federal court adjudication only with respect to the particular parties in the
litigation rather than with respect to the legal issue at hand.211 Even though a
particular plaintiff might not have standing, some plaintiff likely will have
standing to litigate the issue in federal court and eventually enable
authoritative resolution by the Supreme Court. Further, the Court has held
that it has Article III authority to review a state court judgment entered
against a defendant even if the plaintiff lacked Article III standing; the
defendant’s loss effectively gives the defendant standing to seek review in
the Supreme Court.212 So even despite standing asymmetry, federal questions
should eventually receive federal court answers.
By contrast, an Article III-based political question doctrine risks
causing far more severe asymmetry because the doctrine is based on the issue
rather than the parties. If the political question doctrine deprives federal
courts of Article III authority over the question itself, then it deprives them

206

Fletcher, supra note 174, at 264.
Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 282–83 (1961).
208 See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1952) (dismissing a state court appeal for
lack of Article III standing but leaving the underlying state court judgment intact). For exploration, see
Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 304 (2005).
209 Hall, supra note 178, at 1259.
210 See Bennett, supra note 169, at 1229. In one example, the California supreme court upheld the
standing of California taxpayers to challenge, under federal civil rights laws, the involuntary
administration of psychotropic drugs on California prisoners, see Keyhea v. Rushen, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762,
765–66 (1992), a basis for standing rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court, see Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) (rejecting most taxpayer standing in federal courts).
211 See David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 808–09 (2016).
212 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617–18 (1989).
207
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of authority with respect to that question for all parties and no matter which
party seeks review in the Supreme Court.
As Judge Fletcher has argued, Article III asymmetry hinders “the
Supreme Court’s most important institutional function,” which “is to serve
as the final appellate tribunal on questions of federal law.”213 Jurists have
long worried that state judges might be swayed by local prejudices, perhaps
because of their connection to their electorates, even when adjudicating
questions of federal law.214 States might also disagree about the meaning of
federal law, creating a patchwork of interpretations of law that ought to be
uniform throughout the nation. 215 The states’ own variegated political
question doctrines might make a question justiciable only in some state
courts—meaning that citizens of one state might be able to seek adjudication
of a particular question of federal law while citizens of other states could not.
Supreme Court review would be unavailable to correct those state court
errors and instances of disuniformity, 216 resulting in “public mischiefs
that . . . would be truly deplorable.”217
To illustrate, consider the Guarantee Clause. Although the federal
courts consider nearly all Guarantee Clause questions nonjusticiable,218 and
213

Fletcher, supra note 174, at 283–84.
See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) (“[S]tate attachments, state
prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to
obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice.”). For a more modern debate on the relative
competence of federal and state courts adjudicating federal questions, see Burt Neuborne, The Myth of
Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1131 (1977) (finding federal courts superior); Akhil Reed Amar, A NeoFederalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205,
230 (1985) (same); and Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 605, 633–35 (1981) (defending state court adjudication of federal constitutional
questions).
215 Cf. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 347–48 (noting “the importance, and even necessity of
uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States”).
216 Although the Framers understood that state courts would hear federal claims, see THE
FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 555 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[I]n every case in which
they were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the national legislature, [state courts] will of course
take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth.”), they assumed the Supreme Court
would be available to review state court decisions. See id. NO. 81, at 542 (“That there ought to be one
court of supreme and final jurisdiction, is a proposition which is not likely to be contested.”); id. NO. 22,
at 143–44 (arguing for Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state courts to create uniformity); James
E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of JurisdictionStripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 201–19 (2007) (detailing the history).
217 See Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 348; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535 (describing the
prospect of state court final authority over federal law as “a hydra in government, from which nothing
but contradiction and confusion can proceed”).
218 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 3534.1 n.138 (citing cases). Contra New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (“[P]erhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present
nonjusticiable political questions.”); Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 744 F.3d 1156, 1172–81 (10th Cir. 2014)
214
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although the U.S. Supreme Court in Pacific States held that challenges to
state constitutional referendum and initiative processes were nonjusticiable
political questions in federal court,219 some (though not all) state courts have
been more willing to adjudicate such questions. Some state courts have
concluded, on the merits, that ballot initiatives and referenda do not
contravene the Guarantee Clause. 220 Pacific States itself, because it
dismissed the writ of error for lack of jurisdiction,221 allowed the underlying
Oregon Supreme Court decision on the merits to stand, which had upheld an
earlier state case construing the Guarantee Clause:
[T]he defendants are met with the contention that the question as to whether an
amendment to the Constitution has been regularly proposed, adopted, and
ratified is for the political department of the government, not for the courts . . . .
[W]e have carefully examined our right to inquire into the regularity of the
adoption of the proposed amendment, and are clear that its validity is a judicial,
and not a political, question. . . .
Nor do we think the amendment void because in conflict with [the Guarantee
Clause]. The purpose of this provision of the Constitution is to protect the
people of the several states against aristocratic and monarchical invasions, and
against insurrections and domestic violence, and to prevent them from
abolishing a republican form of government. . . . But it does not forbid them
from amending or changing their Constitution in any way they may see fit, so
long as none of these results is accomplished. No particular style of government
is designated in the Constitution as republican, nor is its exact form in any way
prescribed. A republican form of government is a government administered by
representatives chosen or appointed by the people or by their authority. . . .
[T]he initiative and referendum amendment does not abolish or destroy the
republican form of government, or substitute another in its place. 222

A number of other state courts have held similarly.223 Meanwhile, other
state courts have held such Guarantee Clause claims nonjusticiable in state
(deciding a Guarantee Clause challenge to a Colorado ballot initiative to require voter approval for
virtually any tax or spending increase was not precluded by the political question doctrine).
219 Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133, 150–51 (1912).
220 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 943 P.2d 283, 286 (Wash. 1997) (dismissing the appeal after conducting
an “examination of the record” revealing many precedents finding initiative laws to be constitutional
under the Guarantee Clause); In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d 772, 780–81 (Okla. 1991)
(upholding the state initiative process against a challenge under the Guarantee Clause). For a discussion,
see Hans A. Linde, When Is Initiative Lawmaking Not “Republican Government”?, 17 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 159, 161 (1989).
221 223 U.S. at 151 (“[I]t follows that the case presented is not within our jurisdiction, and the writ
of error must therefore be, and it is, dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”).
222 Kadderly v. City of Portland, 74 P. 710, 714–15, 719–20 (Or. 1903); see also State v. Pac. States
Tel. & Tel. Co., 99 P. 427, 428 (Or. 1909) (citing this passage).
223 See In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d at 780–81 (holding the state initiative process
constitutional under the Guarantee Clause).
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court.224 Thus, some states have held initiative or referendum processes to be
consistent with the Guarantee Clause, while other states refuse to resolve the
issue. Various other state court interpretations of the Guarantee Clause exist,
including that it is consistent with a state constitutional provision requiring
approval of state laws by the county electorate,225 that it requires state taxes
to be used only for public purposes, 226 that it is consistent with a “threestrikes” law,227 that it allows a state to give the governor the power to issue
executive orders subject to a legislative veto,228 and that it prevents American
Indian tribes from asserting immunity to state election laws. 229 This
patchwork of interpretations of the federal Constitution means differing
applicability in different states, and different opportunities for enforcement
in different states. Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court can supply neither
uniformity nor correction.
In addition to these practical problems, state court adjudication of the
Guarantee Clause is legally odd because the Guarantee Clause specifically
obligates the “United States”—not the states themselves—to guarantee to
the states a republican form of government. 230 True, the clause implicitly
obligates the states to create and maintain a republican form of
government. 231 But as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Guarantee
Clause specifically allocates to the United States the power to decide when
that government is republican and when it is not. 232 Indeed, Luther made
enough of this directive—interpreting the “United States” to mean,
specifically, Congress and the President—as to exclude the federal courts
from independently resolving a republican-in-form challenge. 233 Yet
deciding whether a state government is republican in form under the clause
is precisely what state courts have purported to do. That asymmetry between
state and federal courts can only be explained by grounding the political

224 See Huddleston v. Sawyer, 932 P.2d 1145, 1159–62 (Or. 1997) (holding Guarantee Clause
challenges to ballot initiatives nonjusticiable); State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473, 481–82 (Wash. 1996)
(same).
225 See Cagle v. Qualified Electors of Winston Cnty., 470 So. 2d 1208, 1210–11 (Ala. 1985).
226 See Heimerl v. Ozaukee County, 40 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Wis. 1949); City of Cleveland v. Ruple,
200 N.E. 507, 510 (Ohio 1936); Beach v. Bradstreet, 82 A. 1030, 1032 (Conn. 1912).
227 See State v. Davis, 943 P.2d 283, 284–85, 286 (Wash. 1997).
228 See VanSickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223, 242–43 (Kan. 1973).
229 See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Super. Ct., 148 P.3d 1126, 1138–39 (Cal. 2006).
230 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
231 See Minor v. Hapersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175 (1874) (“The guaranty necessarily implies a
duty on the part of the States themselves to provide such a government.”).
232 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
233 Id. (“[T]he right to decide is placed there, and not in the courts.”).
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question doctrine in Article III, which presents no bar to state court
adjudication.234
The consequences of Article III asymmetry become preposterous when
followed to the logical extreme. If Article III allows state courts to determine
the meaning of “republican form of government” in the Guarantee Clause
despite a commitment of the question to Congress or the President, then
Article III should present no bar to state court determination of the meaning
of the word “try” in the Impeachments Clause, of “war” in the Declare War
Clause, or of “citizen of the United States” in the Qualifications Clauses,
among other important constitutional questions seemingly outside the
appropriate scope of authority of state courts. These questions would be
nonjusticiable political questions in federal court. But if the reason they are
political questions in federal court is because of Article III, then state courts
could hear and decide them.235 That cannot be true.
IV. REFOCUSING ON SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Article III cannot be the source of the federal political question doctrine.
What, then, is the source of the political question doctrine, and does it have
any ties to Article III?
The answer is that the political question doctrine is sourced in the
substantive law at issue. It is the Guarantee Clause itself (or the
Impeachments Clause itself, or even the Equal Protection Clause itself) that
makes something nonjusticiable. Application of the doctrine can have (but
need not always have) Article III effects by, say, calling for the application
of standards that fall outside what Article III contemplates as “judicial”
power.236 But the doctrine begins with substantive law.237 This Part explains
this reorientation in more detail and explores some of its ramifications.

234

See Edward A. Stelzer, Note, Bearing the Judicial Mantle: State Court Enforcement of the
Guarantee Clause, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 894–98 (1993).
235 The Constitution and federal law may restrict state courts in other ways, such as through immunity
doctrines or bars on certain kinds of relief. See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 4213 (noting that
state courts cannot issue writs of mandamus against federal officers or writs of habeas corpus for those
in federal custody, and that the Supreme Court has never decided whether state courts can enjoin federal
officers, but that state courts can issue most other forms of relief against federal officers). But these
limitations need not necessarily arise in state court cases presenting federal political questions and, in any
event, have nothing to do with Article III.
236 Somewhat differently, Professor John Harrison argued, prior to Rucho, that the political question
doctrine operates wholly outside of Article III. See Harrison, supra note 46, at 497–98. As I explain
below, I believe the doctrine can have important Article III effects that help explain cases like Rucho,
which seem in tension with Professor Harrison’s theory.
237 This idea is hinted at, but not explained, in WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 3534.3 (suggesting
“that political-question doctrine invariably has roots deeper than Article III alone”).
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A. The Primacy of Substantive Law
The political question cases fall into roughly two categories
corresponding to each of the first two Baker factors. Those categorizations
are driven by substantive law. In Factor 1 cases, a “textual commitment”
refers to the underlying substantive law—the Impeachments Clause, the
Militia Clause, the Qualifications Clause, or the like—and asks whether the
substantive law allocates interpretive or decision-making authority over the
question to an entity other than the federal courts.238 If so, then Article III has
nothing more to add. Nonjusticiability under Factor 1 thus arises from
substantive law rather than anything in Article III.
Article III is itself allocative by committing judicial powers to the courts
and, by implication, excluding the courts from legislative and executive
powers. But the Article III allocative standards do not drive the Factor 1
determination and, indeed, are irrelevant to it. A question could meet all of
the requirements of Article III, in that it is brought in the form of a
constitutional “case” and with “judicial” standards available for
adjudication, but if the substantive law commits the question instead to a
coordinate branch, then the question is nonjusticiable in the federal courts
despite Article III.239
Pure Factor 2 cases are somewhat different. To date, Rucho v. Common
Cause is the only pure Factor 2 case,240 finding that the Constitution provided
no judicially manageable or discoverable standards for distinguishing

238 Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012) (looking to Article II to determine whether the
federal courts could resolve whether a statute unconstitutionally infringed the executive power); Nixon
v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229–31 (1993) (interpreting the Impeachments Clause to commit to the
Senate the option to use a committee to take evidence during an impeachment trial); Gilligan v. Morgan,
413 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1973) (construing the Militia Clause to allocate decision-making authority over militia
training to Congress and the President); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521–22 (1969) (relying on
the text of the Qualifications Clause to determine which questions were committed to the House and
which were justiciable); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133, 150–51 (1912)
(construing the language of the Guarantee Clause to allocate the republican-form guarantee to Congress);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (same). While some of these cases also used Baker
Factor 2, they did so to aid the determination of Factor 1. See, e.g., Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 196–97 (calling
the question a “familiar” question of judicial review customary for the courts); Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–
29 (“[T]he lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually
demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”).
239 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198–209 (1962) (analyzing the political question doctrine
independently after determining proper subject matter jurisdiction and authority under Article III); cf.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 96 (1998) (emphasizing “the fundamental distinction
between arguing no cause of action and arguing no Article III redressability”); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 682 (1946) (holding the lack of a legal claim for relief under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
be a question of merits, not a question of Article III jurisdiction).
240 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2515 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“For the first time in this Nation’s history,
the majority . . . cannot find a workable legal standard to apply.”).
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constitutional from unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.241 Pure Factor
2 cases are not based on a determination that substantive law allocates
authority to a specific decision-maker. Indeed, Rucho disclaimed any such
allocation.242 But Factor 2 cases are still based on the underlying substantive
law. Rucho itself focused on the standards supplied by the substantive law,
noting that the Constitution prohibits only partisan gerrymandering that is
“too much.”243 The Court rejected proposed tests that were consistent with
Article III because they were incompatible with the standards supplied by
the Equal Protection Clause.244 Thus, Factor 2 cases like Rucho are based on
the standards supplied by the substantive law. If a court determines that the
standards supplied by the substantive law are not judicially discoverable or
manageable, then that determination will have an Article III effect of
rendering an adjudicative decision based on those standards outside the
“judicial” power. 245 So Factor 2 does implicate Article III. But the
determination of the existence of a political question is sourced, just like in
Factor 1 cases, in substantive law.
B. Implications and Corollaries
Locating the political question doctrine in substantive law has a number
of effects. I explore six below.

241 Id. at 2500 (majority opinion). This rationale is hard to square with the multitude of other
constitutional provisions presenting similar difficulties that the Court has deemed justiciable, including
the Equal Protection Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the First Amendment. See Pushaw, supra note
90, at 1176 (“[M]any constitutional provisions, not just those the Court has deemed ‘political,’ appear to
lack judicially discoverable and manageable standards. . . . In fact, much of modern constitutional law
arguably involves policy choices that should be resolved through the political process.”); MARTIN H.
REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 122–26 (1991); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (stating that courts inquiring into what laws are “necessary” would
“pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department and . . . tread on legislative ground”). It also
ignores Professor Richard Fallon’s astute observation that “[j]udicially manageable standards . . . are far
more often the products or outputs of constitutional adjudication than inherent elements of the
Constitution’s meaning.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2006). Finally, Rucho did not offer judicially manageable
standards for determining when there are no judicially manageable standards. See G. Michael Parsons,
Gerrymandering & Justiciability: The Political Question Doctrine After Rucho v. Common Cause,
95 IND. L.J. 1295, 1345–48 (2020). Nevertheless, such is the legacy of Rucho.
242 139 S. Ct. at 2495–96.
243 Id. at 2501 (internal quotation marks omitted).
244 Id. at 2502–03 (rejecting the racial-gerrymandering standard as inapposite to the Equal Protection
Clause inquiry for political gerrymandering).
245 See id. at 2500. It is an open question as to whether technological advances could turn an
otherwise nonjudicial standard into a judicial standard within the scope of Article III. See Andrew Chin,
Gregory Herschlag & Jonathan Mattingly, The Signature of Gerrymandering in Rucho v. Common
Cause, 70 S.C. L. REV. 1241, 1242–43 (2019) (“[W]e have developed and witnessed the emergence of
promising new statistical methods for identifying partisan gerrymandering and quantifying its effects.”).
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1. Jurisdictionality
Political question cases based on Factor 1 do not present defects in
jurisdiction, at least as that term is currently understood.246 If the allocated
decision-maker has decided the question, then the federal court can apply
that decision and, if appropriate, resolve the remainder of the case on the
merits.247 If the allocated decision-maker has not decided the question, then
the court can dismiss the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, 248 enter summary judgment, resolve the claim on other
grounds, or abstain or stay resolution of the claim or issue until the
appropriate decision-maker has delivered an answer.249 In no circumstance
should the court dismiss for lack of jurisdiction a case presenting a Factor 1
political question.250
The nonjurisdictionality of Factor 1 questions does not mean that
parties could force a federal court, by operation of litigation waiver or
forfeiture, to decide an issue committed to another branch. The defense of
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted may be raised for
the first time at trial. 251 Further, identification of textual constitutional

246 A reconceptualization of jurisdiction based on allocative force might lead to a different set of
remedies. See Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619, 633–37, 651–53 (2017)
(setting out an allocative theory of jurisdiction and applying it to the political question doctrine).
247 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 47 (1849) (stating that if “a question [is] to be settled by
the political power,” then “when that power has decided, the courts are bound to take notice of its decision,
and to follow it”); see also Harrison, supra note 46, at 487 (making this argument); cf. Grove, supra note
21, at 1909 (showing that the traditional political question doctrine was about deference rather than
jurisdiction). Nixon thus granted the wrong relief. There, Nixon filed a declaratory judgment action
seeking a declaration “that the conviction voted by the Senate on the impeachment charges is void”
because the procedures used violated the Impeachments Clause. Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9,
10 (D.D.C. 1990). The district court dismissed the claim as nonjusticiable, id. at 14, but the court instead
should have entered judgment on the merits for the defendant. The Senate’s conviction answered the
question, committed by the Impeachments Clause to the Senate, of whether the Senate’s procedures
complied with the Impeachments Clause, and the answer resolved the legal claim—whether the court
should declare the impeachment void—against the plaintiff.
248 Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 3–4, 6 (1973) (reversing the judgment of the court of appeals,
which itself had reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing the case for failure to state
a claim).
249 Unlike in the Erie context, the federal court should not “guess” at what the specified decisionmaker would do. In the Erie context, federal courts are authorized by Article III and federal statute to
decide cases under state law and have a general duty to do so even when state law presents unanswered
questions. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705–06 (1992) (reversing the Fifth Circuit’s
holding that it lacked jurisdiction in a diversity case). By contrast, a question allocated by the Constitution
exclusively to a different decision-maker deprives federal courts of authority even to guess at what the
decision-maker would do.
250 Pacific States thus reached the wrong result when it dismissed the writ of error for lack of
jurisdiction. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133, 150–51 (1912). For the correct
result, see infra text accompanying notes 287–290.
251 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2)(C).
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commitments is not likely to be overlooked, and nothing prevents a court
from invoking them sua sponte or from affirming the existence of a political
question over all parties’ objections.252 In sum, Factor 1 political questions
do not divest federal courts of jurisdiction, and the court can protect the
allocated decision-maker’s prerogative to answer the political question
notwithstanding any litigant conduct.
Factor 2 cases get to the same answer through a different path. A case
whose adjudication on the merits depends upon the resolution of nonjudicial
standards supplied by the substantive federal law cannot be adjudicated by
federal courts consistent with Article III. But that does not mean that the case
falls outside of Article III. To the contrary, the case itself falls within Article
III and potentially could be adjudicated if the court can avoid answering the
questions whose resolution is prohibited by Article III. If the court cannot
avoid such questions, then, like in Factor 1 cases, the remedy is to decide the
case by, for example, striking a defense containing a Factor 2 political
question or dismissing a claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Factor 2 cases do present the possibility that the parties
will stipulate to a judicially manageable standard for resolution of the
political question and that the court will decide the question based on that
standard. 253 The court would not be required to adhere to the parties’
stipulated test,254 but the court could without violating Article III.
2. Effects on State Courts
Although Factor 1 and Factor 2 cases are resolved the same way with
respect to federal jurisdiction, they affect state courts differently. Factor 1
political questions arise because substantive law, rather than Article III,
allocates decision-making or interpretive authority to a specific decisionmaker. To whom that allocation is made and whether the allocation is
exclusive are questions of federal substantive law that, unlike Article III, are
binding on state courts under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.255 If the
Impeachments Clause commits impeachment trials solely to the Senate, then
252 See Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 14–17
(2014) (explaining why courts retain authority to enforce the law despite party preferences and litigation
conduct); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2) (giving courts the authority to eliminate claims or defenses and to
amend pleadings).
253 See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 48 (2011) (assuming, without
deciding, that the legal standard applied by the court of appeals is correct and resolving the case using
that standard).
254 See Dodson, supra note 252, at 17–19 (discussing when courts may abide by party stipulations of
legal standards).
255 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”).
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neither federal courts nor state courts can usurp that authority, regardless of
Article III limitations or state court authorizations. Factor 1 political
questions thus apply with equal force in state court because of the normal
application of the Supremacy Clause to federal substantive law. 256 The
preemptive force of the substantive law resolves most of the state court–
federal court tension created by Article III asymmetry in Factor 1 cases.
One peculiarity potentially remains. What if a constitutional provision
textually commits a decisional or interpretive question to the states, or even
to state courts? Examples include Article I, Section Four (committing to the
state legislatures exclusive authority over the “places” of choosing U.S.
senators257); Article I, Section Two (committing authority for issuing a writ
of election to fill a vacancy in the U.S. House of Representatives to “the
Executive Authority” of the represented state258); Article I, Section Eight,
Clause Sixteen (reserving authority for the appointment of militia officers to
the states 259 ); and Article II, Section One (committing authority for the
appointing of electors for presidential elections to the state legislatures260),
256 See Harrison, supra note 46, at 497 (“When some source of federal law assigns final decisional
authority to a political actor, the state courts must respect that federal rule just as much as the federal
courts must.”).
257 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the places of chusing Senators.”).
258 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (“When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive
Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.”). The Seventeenth Amendment
makes a similar commitment for Senate vacancies. Id. amend. XVII, § 2 (“When vacancies happen in the
representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election
to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may
direct.”).
259 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (“reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers” of the
state militias).
260 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”). Determining the scope of the state’s appointment authority under the
Electors Clause is not a political question. See infra Section IV.B.3 (distinguishing between nonjusticiable
political questions and justiciable ancillary questions); cf. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323
(2020) (holding that the Electors Clause gives states the power to enforce pledge laws by fining faithless
electors). But asking a court to exercise the appointment power under the Electors Clause would present
a Factor 1 political question allocated to a decision-maker other than the courts. Thus, the bill of complaint
filed by the State of Texas as an original action in the Supreme Court alleging that other states usurped
their legislatures’ prerogatives under the Electors Clause, see Bill of Complaint at 3, Texas v.
Pennsylvania, No. 22-O-155 (S. Ct. Nov. 8, 2020), presented a justiciable question that the Court could
have answered in a declaration (had other defects in the complaint not prevented adjudication). But the
injunctive relief sought—especially asking the Court to “enjoin” the defendant states from using the
election results to appoint electors and asking the Court to “direct” the defendant states’ legislatures “to
appoint a new set of presidential electors,” id. at 40—likely would have been prohibited by the political
question doctrine. For more on this point, see Scott Dodson, Texas v. Pennsylvania and the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 141, 142.
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among others. Although the federal political question doctrine is closely
associated with the federal separation of powers, 261 its manifestation in
Factor 1 cases operates according to the allocative text of the substantive
law. In such cases, a textual commitment to a state legislature is no different
from a textual commitment to Congress.
If the constitutional allocation of authority in any of these provisions
extends to state courts as part of the “state” or its lawmaking authority,262 or
as appropriately delegated by state law,263 then the political question doctrine
might give state courts ultimate authority over such federal constitutional
questions. In such a case, the political question doctrine would require
federal courts—including the Supreme Court—to defer to the interpretation
of the U.S. Constitution provided by the state courts. Such a result is not
without irony, but it is consistent with the idea behind the political question
doctrine’s Factor 1: the people are entitled, through their Constitution, to
allocate power as they see fit, including by assigning some final interpretive
authority to the state courts.
Factor 2 cases pose different challenges. In these cases, the substantive
law does not allocate authority over the claim away from the federal courts
but rather requires the application of nonjudicial standards prohibited to
federal courts by Article III. This situation is in contrast with instances in
which the substantive law provides no claim at all. If the law supplied no
claim for relief at all, then the absence of a claim would be binding on state
courts too, and state courts would be prohibited from ordering affirmative
relief.264 But Factor 2 cases like Rucho operate differently. Rucho did not
deny the existence of a claim; rather, it denied that federal courts could,
consistent with Article III, adjudicate the claim using the standards the claim

261

See supra Part I. Most political questions do implicate the federal separation of powers because
the Constitution’s principal object is to allocate authority among the federal branches, but that is no reason
to exclude the rarer textual commitments to the states from the political question doctrine.
262 Cf. Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2015)
(interpreting Article I’s delegation of redistricting to the state legislatures to be a delegation of lawmaking
power that the state could choose to implement by initiative and gubernatorial veto). For the view that a
constitutional commitment to state “legislatures” manifests a restriction on the exercise of that delegated
power through other state governmental mechanisms or entities, see generally Michael T. Morley, The
Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, 55 GA. L. REV. 1, 8
(2020).
263 I say more about delegation of political questions below. See infra Section IV.B.5.
264 Because the scope of federal law is defined by federal law, states cannot order more or less relief
than what federal law prescribes. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (“[A] State may not impose
such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains
from imposing them.” (emphasis omitted)).
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called for. 265 In effect, federal claims for unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering exist but require the application of standards prohibited to
the federal courts by Article III.
Under the Supremacy Clause, substantive federal law and standards
apply fully in state court. But Article III does not. Although a state could
impose Article III requirements on its courts as a matter of choice, a state
need not do so, and many have not.266 State law may empower state courts to
use a broad range of decisional standards, including nonjudicial or even
political standards that Article III disables federal courts from using. It is
thus possible that state courts could have adjudicated the federal claims in
Rucho even though the federal courts could not.
Although I detailed some of the ills of asymmetrical jurisdiction
above, 267 I think those ills are not as problematic in state partisangerrymandering cases—the only pure Baker Factor 2 category to date. 268
Partisan-gerrymandering claims involve questions of state politics, an area
of familiarity to some state courts; some states even arrange a loose
collaboration between their legislatures and their courts for districting. 269
Although state courts might generate a patchwork of different interpretations
of how the Constitution applies to various districting plans, federal
uniformity is not as important in this scenario because a state’s partisan
gerrymandering affects only candidates standing for election in that state.
Rucho itself acknowledged that state law can constrain state redistricting
beyond what federal law requires,270 meaning that state law itself creates a
patchwork of restricting standards from state to state. That Texas has a
different view of the Constitution’s restrictions on partisan gerrymandering
in Texas than Oklahoma’s view in Oklahoma is no different than if Texas
and Oklahoma had different state constitutional standards for
gerrymandering. The states’ prerogatives over districting already
contemplate nonuniformity.271
265 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2019) (“[The claim requires] political judgment
about how much representation particular political parties deserve . . . . But federal courts are not
equipped to apportion political power as a matter of fairness, nor is there any basis for concluding that
they were authorized to do so.” (emphasis omitted)).
266 See supra text accompanying notes 170–200.
267 See supra Section III.B.2.
268 Were the Court to expand Factor 2 far beyond partisan gerrymandering, asymmetric jurisdiction
might be more troubling.
269 See, e.g., Brooks v. Hobbie, 631 So. 2d 883, 889–90 (Ala. 1993) (stating that the legislature has
“initial responsibility” and the courts have responsibility if the legislature “fails to act”).
270 139 S. Ct. at 2507–08.
271 See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) (“We say once again what has been said on many
occasions: reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or
other body, rather than of a federal court.”).
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A more intractable and pernicious concern is the potential for partisan
entrenchment of state courts. Because most state judges are elected
according to state-drawn districts, 272 state judges might decide state
redistricting cases in ways that directly benefit their reelection chances. They
may underenforce the Constitution when partisan gerrymanders work in their
favor and overenforce it when they do not. Further, the likely identity
between the party controlling a state legislature and a party controlling that
state’s judiciary means that partisan-gerrymandering challenges in state
courts are likely to be rejected on the merits, resulting in a systemic
underenforcement of the Constitution exceedingly permissive of partisan
gerrymanders. Across states, gerrymandering could create a race to the
bottom: if a Republican-controlled state is increasingly gerrymandered
Republican, a Democrat-controlled state might try to compensate by more
extremely gerrymandering its districts to be Democratic. Meanwhile, Rucho
prevents the more neutral, unelected federal judiciary from intervening and
preventing these situations.
Still, protections against such extremes do exist. States can adopt, and
many have adopted, neutral redistricting procedures to avoid overly partisan
gerrymanders.273 In addition, some state laws and constitutions exert controls
on partisan gerrymandering that are equivalent to or even stricter than the
federal Constitution and that state courts can (and do) enforce. 274 If those
state laws supply substantive standards that could be applied by federal
courts consistently with Article III, then such state law challenges to partisan
272

See Dodson, supra note 183, at 178–80.
See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, §§ 44–46 (creating a commission); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6
(same). The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of such commissions. See Ariz. State Legis.
v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658–59 (2015). But see Morley, supra note 262,
at 38–45 (challenging their constitutionality).
274 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20(a) (“No apportionment plan or individual district shall be
drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.”); MO. CONST. art. III,
§ 3(b)(5) (“Districts shall be designed in a manner that achieves both partisan fairness and, secondarily,
competitiveness . . . . ‘Partisan fairness’ means that parties shall be able to translate their popular support
into legislative representation with approximately equal efficiency.”); IOWA CODE § 42.4(5) (2021) (“No
district shall be drawn for the purpose of favoring a political party, incumbent legislator or member of
Congress, or other person or group.”). The presence of state laws might suggest that, as a practical matter,
any asymmetry regarding federal claims would be marginal at best because parties would assert only state
law claims. Yet the number of redistricting cases that are litigated as federal constitutional challenges is
evidence of the propensity to mount federal law challenges. The reasons are many. Parties may wish to
influence state constitutional provisions that are keyed to analogous federal constitutional provisions.
Impact litigation brought by interest groups less concerned about a particular state may prefer to obtain
federal precedent that can be used in other states. Precedent on federal law might be the only way to
control partisan gerrymandering in a state like West Virginia, which has mandated such extreme judicial
deference to the compatibility of state law with the state constitution, see State v. Gainer, 143 S.E.2d 351,
357 (W. Va. 1965), as to provide virtually no state law restriction on state gerrymanders, see State v.
Tennant, 730 S.E.2d 368, 388–90 (W. Va. 2012).
273
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gerrymanders might even be brought in federal court on grounds of diversity
or supplemental jurisdiction. Finally, Congress could provide statutory
uniformity.275
In sum, Factor 1 cases should see no difference in state or federal court
because substantive law supplying the allocation to a particular decisionmaker will control in both forums. In Factor 2 cases, the standards supplied
by substantive law will be the same in both judicial systems, but some state
courts may be authorized to use those standards to decide questions that
would be nonjusticiable in federal court.
3. Determining the Allocation
Because the political question doctrine is not sourced in Article III,
courts—including federal courts—will have jurisdiction over ancillary
questions related to a political question in the substantive law. The most
obvious ancillary question is determining when a political question exists,
either because it allocates decision-making authority away from the federal
courts or because the substantive law’s content lacks judicially discoverable
or manageable standards.276
Another, perhaps equally important, justiciable question exists in Factor
1 cases: which decision-maker has authority, under the substantive law, to
decide the political question presented? Courts can answer that question and
enforce the Constitution’s allocation through judicial relief. For example, if
the House of Representatives purported to “try” an impeachment, a court
could declare that the House has no power to try an impeachment and enjoin
the House from proceeding. Similar questions could arise in the context of,
say, the President attempting to declare war or a state seeking to judge the
qualifications of a U.S. congressperson. The courts therefore retain an
important role to play in arbitrating which decision-maker has the allocated
authority to decide a political question, even if the courts cannot decide the
political question itself.
Luther correctly implements these principles: by deferring to the
decisions of the political branches with authority to decide the Guarantee
275 See, e.g., H.R. 1, 116th Cong., §§ 2401(a), (c) (2019) (requiring independent commissions and
establishing nonpartisan criteria).
276 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure
been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch
exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”); see also
HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 11–12 (1961) (“[T]he courts are
called upon to judge whether the Constitution has committed to another agency of government the
autonomous determination of the issue raised, a finding that itself requires an interpretation.”). For a
criticism of this power, see Grove, supra note 21, at 1911–13, 1962–64 (arguing that this power is a tool
of judicial supremacy).
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Clause question presented, and by chastising the lower federal court for
usurping that authority, the Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction and
authority to protect the Constitution’s delegation of the question to a
coordinate branch.277 Similarly, in Zivotofsky, the Court noted the political
question of determining the political status of Jerusalem but retained
authority for deciding whether Congress’s attempt to influence that political
question invaded the President’s authority over it.278
Pacific States, 279 by contrast, reached the wrong result. There, the
Oregon Supreme Court held, on the merits and after independent
adjudication, that Oregon’s initiative procedure was consistent with the
Guarantee Clause.280 On writ of error, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ
for lack of jurisdiction based on Baker Factor 1 and the conclusion that the
question of determining whether a state government was republican in form
was committed to Congress. 281 But by so holding, the Supreme Court
allowed to stand the state court’s resolution of that very question, which was
instead Congress’s prerogative to answer. That was a mistake. The Supreme
Court’s determination that the Guarantee Clause question was committed to
Congress was equally binding on the Oregon Supreme Court and rendered
the Oregon Supreme Court’s judgment an unconstitutional invasion of
Congress’s powers. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have vacated
the state court’s judgment to protect Congress’s prerogative in deciding the
political question at hand.282
In sum, the scope of the textual commitment, the identity of the
decision-maker allocated authority under the commitment, and whether to
protect that decision-maker’s constitutional prerogative are all within
judicial authority and jurisdiction.
4. Multiple Laws
Sourcing the political question doctrine in substantive law rather than
Article III also helps reconcile the doctrine with the Supreme Court’s
reservation of authority to decide certain cases involving political questions.
The reconciliation involves the applicability of multiple laws. Although a

277

Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 46–47 (1849).
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012). In other cases, the Court has noted a political
question but held the case not to infringe upon the allocated decision-maker’s prerogative. E.g.,
Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19 (1972) (holding that a state recount in a contested Senate election
did not infringe the Senate’s constitutionally committed authority to decide which candidate to seat).
279 Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
280 State v. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 99 P. 427, 428 (Or. 1908).
281 Pac. States, 223 U.S. at 133, 150–51.
282 The Supreme Court has asserted the power of vacatur over state court judgments before. See Hall,
supra note 178, at 1291–92; 16B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 4015.
278
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political question in one constitutional provision may allocate authority over
that question to a nonjudicial decision-maker, a different constitutional
provision might confer justiciability over a certain facet of that question.
For example, although the Senate may have the “sole” power to “try”
impeachments under the Impeachments Clause, the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment might provide for judicial scrutiny of the outer bounds
of the process provided. Such a result might explain why several justices
supported judicial review of impeachment convictions based on methods that
seriously weaken the integrity of those convictions, such as coin flips. 283
Importantly, the question of whether the Senate tried the impeached official
would still be a nonjusticiable political question committed to the Senate, but
whether that trial comported with the Fifth Amendment might be a
justiciable question for the courts.284 The same principles might apply to Fifth
Amendment challenges to the President’s pardoning power 285 if, say, the
President issued a blanket pardon to all white federal prisoners but no Black
federal prisoners. These principles would apply equally to an identical
challenge brought in state court.
Courts have followed these principles in analogous state political
question cases. In Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth, for example, a
state court judge was impeached and convicted under provisions of the
Pennsylvania constitution that mimic the provisions of the federal
Constitution.286 The impeached judge filed a § 1983 lawsuit in federal court,
challenging the procedures used by the state senate as denying due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Third Circuit held that although the
state constitution committed the impeachment process to the relevant state
political branches, the Fourteenth Amendment claim presented no political
283 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 239 (1993) (White, J., concurring); id. at 253–54
(Souter, J., concurring); cf. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (“Judicial intervention [under the Due Process Clause] might, for example, be warranted
in the face of a scheme whereby a state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency [to
an inmate on death row], or in a case where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its
clemency process.”).
284 Professor Michael Gerhardt rejects judicial review of impeachments under the Fifth Amendment
because, in his view, the Due Process Clause secures no more process than what the Impeachments
Clauses already provide. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of
Impeachments After Nixon, 44 DUKE L.J. 231, 235–65 (1994). Gerhardt’s conclusion, even if correct, is
based upon analysis and construction of the Fifth Amendment, not Article III, and sounds more like a
conclusion on the merits of a Fifth Amendment claim than a conclusion that the federal courts lack power
to adjudicate such a claim. Further, ancillary questions, such as whether the Fifth Amendment applies to
impeachment trials and, if so, whether the Fifth Amendment’s standards are judicially discoverable and
manageable, would all be justiciable under the principles articulated in supra Section IV.B.3.
285 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (granting the President the “Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons
for Offences against the United States”).
286 152 F.3d 240, 243–44 (3d Cir. 1998).
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question bar to judicial review; nothing textually committed the Fourteenth
Amendment claim to any other state or federal body, and the Due Process
Clause provided judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
adjudication. 287 Larsen and others help illustrate the principle that
substantive law—sometimes multiple substantive laws—informs
justiciability in Factor 1 cases.
Factor 2 cases illustrate this principle as well. In Baker, the Court held
that, although the Guarantee Clause renders most diluted-voting-power
challenges to state election districting nonjusticiable, the same challenges
under the Equal Protection Clause could be justiciable, in part because the
Equal Protection Clause supplies familiar and judicially manageable
standards for one-person-one-vote and racial-gerrymandering claims.288 In
Rucho, the Court separately considered challenges to partisan
gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment,
and Article I.289 Although the Court found that all three sources supplied only
nonjudicial standards for partisan gerrymandering, the Court considered
each discrete source and its standards for assessing the constitutionality of
partisan gerrymandering. 290 Had any one source supplied justiciable
standards, then the Court could have—should have—adjudicated the
challenge on the merits despite the presence of any nonjusticiable political
questions in the other sources.291
If no constitutional source supplies judicial standards appropriate for
adjudication by federal courts under Article III, Congress could supply
287 Id. at 246–48; see also Bacon v. Lee, 549 S.E.2d 840, 850, 855–56 (N.C. 2001) (holding that
although the state constitution committed exclusive authority over state pardons to the Governor, the
question of whether the Governor exercised that pardon authority in a manner consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment was a justiciable question); cf. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that state inmates on death row have a life interest that justifies application of some
minimal protections under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to a state’s clemency
procedures). Contra Bredesen v. Tenn. Jud. Selection Comm’n, 214 S.W.3d 419, 434–39 (Tenn. 2007)
(considering a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the state Governor’s use of race in considering
appointments to the state judiciary to be nonjusticiable, in part because of the lack of judicially
manageable standards, though nevertheless deciding the claim on the merits).
288 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226, 237 (1962).
289 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019).
290 Id. at 2491–2501.
291 Some language in the Court’s opinion can be read as supporting a blanket determination of
nonjusticiability for partisan-gerrymandering claims regardless of the source of the challenge. Id. at 2506–
07 (“We conclude that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the
federal courts.”). But the Court elsewhere suggested that a different source could offer justiciable
standards. Id. at 2507 (“In 2015, the Supreme Court of Florida struck down that State’s congressional
districting plan as a violation of the Fair Districts Amendment to the Florida Constitution. The dissent
wonders why we can’t do the same. The answer is that there is no ‘Fair Districts Amendment’ to the
Federal Constitution.” (internal citation omitted)). Thus, the better reading of Rucho, in my view, is that
the particular sources used to challenge partisan gerrymandering in Rucho present nonjusticiable claims.

727

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

statutory standards. To combat partisan gerrymandering, Congress could, as
the House attempted in a bill in 2019, exercise its Article I authority over
state election districts by preventing states from taking political-party
affiliation into consideration when drawing congressional districts,
preventing states from drawing congressional districts that unduly disfavor
any political party, and granting federal courts jurisdiction to hear claims for
violations of those prohibitions. 292 Were such a bill to become law and a
plaintiff with standing were to challenge a state districting map under that
federal statute, then the statutory claim could be justiciable in federal court
despite the nonjusticiability of challenging partisan gerrymandering under
constitutional standards. Rucho even appeared to sanction such a regime.293
The acceptance of the principle of multiple laws in Factor 2 cases, then, also
supports the sourcing of the political question doctrine in substantive law
rather than Article III.
5. Delegation
Lodging the political question doctrine in substantive law rather than in
Article III opens the possibility of delegation from the constitutionally
allocated decision-maker to some other decision-maker, including,
potentially, to federal or state courts. The extent to which the Constitution
allows interbranch delegation is subject to voluminous commentary and
continues to be debated.294 I do not mean to take sides in that debate. Rather,
I mean only to say that the constitutionally allocated decision-maker in a
Baker Factor 1 case could—if permitted by delegation norms—delegate
292 See H.R. 1, 116th Cong., § 2413(a)(2) (2019) (“[T]he redistricting plan developed by the
independent redistricting commission shall not, when considered on a Statewide basis, unduly favor or
disfavor any political party.”); id. § 2413(a)(3) (preventing a state districting map from taking into
consideration the “political party affiliation or voting history of the population of a district”); id. § 2432
(providing for enforcement actions by the U.S. Attorney General or private citizens to sue in federal
court).
293 139 S. Ct. at 2507–08.
294 Compare Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“[W]e long have insisted that
‘the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution’ mandate that
Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.”), with J.W. Hampton, Jr. &
Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (endorsing congressional delegation), Gundy v. United
States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123–25 (2019) (reaffirming a broad scope of congressional authority to
delegate), and id. at 2135–42 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (espousing a more limited delegation scope). For
a sampling of academic commentary, see generally Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of
the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1297–99 (2003);
Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of
Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 164–68 (2019); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation
Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 228; Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the
Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 563–65 (2007); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1723–25 (2002). Despite this
commentary, any delegation prohibition goes largely unenforced in practice. See Fallon, supra note 241,
at 1302 & n.123.
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back to the federal courts the political question, and Article III would not
prevent the federal court from answering it.295
Congress might, for example, grant federal courts authority to
adjudicate questions otherwise committed to Congress. In Luther, the Court
suggested just such a legislative–judicial partnership for resolving Guarantee
Clause claims. Luther first approved of Congress’s delegation of its authority
under the Guarantee Clause to the President.296 The Court then suggested
little difference between that delegation and a congressional delegation to
the courts:
It rested with Congress, too, to determine upon the means proper to be adopted
to fulfil this guarantee. They might, if they had deemed it most advisable to do
so, have placed it in the power of a court to decide when the contingency had
happened which required the federal government to interfere. 297

Such judicial delegation is consistent with the widespread belief in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries that the political branches could assign to
the courts responsibility for deciding political questions. 298 Unless such a
statutory delegation is exclusive to the federal courts, both state and federal
courts could then adjudicate claims otherwise beyond their reach under
Factor 1.299
295 In a slightly different context, the Constitution expressly allows Congress to delegate appointment
authority over inferior officers—ordinarily a power committed to the President that is likely to be
considered a political question—to the courts. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[B]ut the Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). And Congress has done so, allowing U.S. courts of
appeals to appoint bankruptcy judges and allowing U.S. district courts to appoint magistrate judges. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 152(a), 631(a). Although this express delegation of appointment power is made by Congress
rather than the President, the courts have exercised this appointment authority without concerns about the
political question doctrine or Article III. Implicitly authorized delegations to the courts ought to be treated
similarly.
296 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (stating that Congress can, and did, delegate to
the President the obligations to “guarantee” and “protect”).
297 Id. at 43.
298 See Oliver P. Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REV.
485, 499, 501–02 (1924) (“Congress can divest a political question of its character by providing that it be
settled by the courts.”); Grove, supra note 21, at 1969 (“[C]ourts and commentators in the nineteenth
century assumed that Congress could transform a ‘political question’ into a ‘judicial question’ by asking
courts to decide the issue.”).
299 One example of a Factor 1 delegation might be the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, which
authorizes judicial enforcement of Congress’s authority to approve federal officers’ receipts of foreign
gifts under the Emoluments Clause. See 5 U.S.C. § 7342(b). The Emoluments Clause prohibits federal
officials from accepting gifts from foreign powers “without the Consent of Congress.” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 8. It is unclear whether this is a Factor 1 political question. Compare Benjamin Wallace
Mendelson, The Nonjusticiable Emoluments Clause, 34 J.L. & POL. 197, 198 (2019) (yes), with Citizens
for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2019) (no), and Jed Handelsman
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In later dictum, however, the Supreme Court stated: “Congress may not
confer jurisdiction on Art. III federal courts to render advisory opinions, or
to entertain ‘friendly’ suits, or to resolve ‘political questions,’ because suits
of this character are inconsistent with the judicial function under Art. III.”300
In reliance on such a position, some lower courts, including, recently, the
D.C. Circuit, have held that Congress cannot delegate political questions to
federal courts: “[A] statute providing for judicial review does not override
Article III’s requirement that federal courts refrain from deciding political
questions.”301
These sentiments are based on an erroneous assumption that the
political question doctrine is grounded in Article III. Perhaps the
nondelegation doctrine would prevent such delegation, or perhaps the
nondelegation doctrine requires a clear statement of delegation of political
questions that a general statute like, say, § 1983, does not provide.302 But
Article III is no barrier to congressional delegation of Factor 1 political
questions to the courts under the framework outlined in this Article.
As for Factor 2 cases, Congress cannot force the federal courts to use
standards prohibited by Article III. Congress could not, for example, force
federal courts to adjudicate challenges to partisan gerrymandering directly
under the Equal Protection Clause, as through § 1983. That is because, unlike
Factor 1 cases, in which nonjusticiability arises because the substantive law
allocates authority away from the federal courts, Factor 2 nonjusticiability
arises because the substantive law supplies standards that cannot be applied
by the federal courts in a manner consistent with Article III. For Factor 2
cases, Congress cannot expand Article III by forcing the federal courts to do
what Article III prevents them from doing.303
There are, however, alternatives. Congress potentially could authorize
federal courts to enforce even nonjusticiable standards under its Fourteenth
Amendment Section Five power.304 Under its Section Five power, Congress
Shugarman & Gautham Rao, Emoluments, Zone of Interests, and Political Questions: A Cautionary Tale,
45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 651, 665–69 (2018) (no).
300 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972) (citations omitted).
301 El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 843 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Bin Ali
Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (reaffirming El-Shifa).
302 Cf. Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (“We expect Congress to speak clearly
if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”).
303 Cf. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361–62 (1911) (holding that Congress cannot
statutorily prescribe a “case” under Article III); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166–67
(1803) (holding that Congress cannot enlarge the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Article III).
304 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.”). Professor Rachel Barkow thinks Section Five is a political
question textually committed to Congress. See Barkow, supra note 21, at 242. If so, then most Section
Five legislation illustrates Factor 1 delegation.
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can supply statutory standards that are more protective of the constitutional
right if designed to prevent unconstitutional behavior.305 By prescribing a set
of Article III-compliant judicial standards designed to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause in partisan-gerrymandering claims, Congress could
obviate the problem of identifying judicial standards for distinguishing
unconstitutional from constitutional partisan gerrymandering, which was the
crux of nonjusticiability in Rucho. 306 To be sure, Section Five itself
circumscribes Congress’s power in setting such prophylactic standards. 307
But that is not a problem inherent to the political question doctrine.
In addition, Congress could authorize non-Article III entities—
including state courts, Article I tribunals, and Article II actors—to decide
questions that would be considered political under Baker Factor 2.308 None
of these entities wields the “judicial power” of Article III, 309 so all are
unconstrained by Baker Factor 2 absent statutory restriction.310 Further, the
Supreme Court would be barred—by Factor 2!—from reviewing decisions

305

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530, 532 (1997) (confirming that Section Five permits
prophylactic legislation).
306 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2019) (“[Federal courts] must be armed with a
standard that can reliably differentiate unconstitutional from ‘constitutional political gerrymandering.’”).
Note that the use of Section Five to supply judicially manageable standards to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause is independent of, and quite different from, Congress’s power under Article I to set
statutory standards to police partisan gerrymandering, as explained in supra text accompanying notes
292–293.
307 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519–20 (requiring enforcement legislation to be “congruen[t] and
proportional[]” to the constitutional violation).
308 Cf. Zachary D. Clopton, Justiciability, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 103 CORNELL
L. REV. 1431, 1432–34 (2018) (arguing that Congress and the states should fill federal court
nonjusticiability gaps through alternative adjudicatory mechanisms such as state courts or agency
tribunals). One example might be the Census Act, which delegates Congress’s constitutional authority
over the decennial census, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that the census shall be conducted
“in such Manner as [Congress] shall by Law direct”), to the Department of Commerce and gives the
Secretary of Commerce broad discretion for conducting the census, see 13 U.S.C. § 141(a) (delegating to
the Secretary oversight of the census “in such form and content as he may determine”), a delegation
sanctioned by the Supreme Court, see Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566–67 (2019).
309 See William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1581 (2020)
(arguing that only Article III courts exercise the “judicial Power”); Hershkoff, supra note 166, at 1868–
75 (stating that non-Article III federal tribunals perform quasi-judicial/quasi-administrative roles and can
issue advisory opinions and the like); 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 3531.13 (asserting that
Article I tribunals are not bound by Article III justiciability doctrines). For example, the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board has adjudicated trademark applications challenged by parties who would not have
standing to do so in federal court. See, e.g., Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1094–95 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
310 Congress can impose Article III-type requirements on Article I courts by statute. See, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 2519 (giving the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over a “case or controversy”).
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by these decision-makers, at least on the basis of faithful application of the
substantive standards.311
6. The State Political Question Doctrine in Federal Courts
Because some states have developed their own versions of the political
question doctrine,312 one question that arises is whether the state or federal
version applies when a federal court hears a state law claim. An Article IIIsourced conception of the political question doctrine would require federal
courts to apply the federal version—but not the state version—even when
the case is based solely on state law. A state constitutional question
committed by the state constitution to the governor, for example, would be
justiciable in federal court if posed within a case otherwise meeting the
requirements of Article III, even if the state constitution would make the
question nonjusticiable in state court.313
By contrast, a substantive-law conception of justiciability would lead
to more sensible, symmetrical results in Factor 1 cases. A state law question
committed to a state governmental entity other than a state court presents no
claim for relief, just like Factor 1 cases in federal court under federal law.314
Under the Rules of Decision Act, a federal court presented with such a state
law claim must apply the substantive state law as the state court would.315
Thus, the state political question doctrine would lead to the same result in
either state or federal court, though it would do so as a product of federal
choice of law rather than direct application of the state political question
doctrine in federal court.
To illustrate, consider Bacon v. Lee, a North Carolina supreme court
decision resolving a challenge to the Governor’s clemency process under
both state law and the Fourteenth Amendment.316 Because the Governor had
the “exclusive prerogative” over clemency,317 the court held the state law
challenges to be nonjusticiable (though it resolved the Fourteenth

311 As discussed above, supra Section IV.B.4, other substantive laws that do not present
nonjusticiable political questions, such as perhaps the Due Process Clause, might apply to the statutorily
prescribed decision-making process and be reviewable on those grounds by the Supreme Court.
312 See supra text accompanying notes 183–185.
313 One could view the federal doctrine grounded in Article III but the state doctrine grounded in
substantive law such that, in effect, both doctrines could apply to limit federal court adjudication of state
claims. But that would be an odd, fundamental divergence for a state doctrine so heavily derived from its
federal counterpart, and I know of no authority adopting or advocating for such a divergence.
314 See supra Section IV.B.1.
315 See 28 U.S.C. § 1652; see also Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (confirming the
applicability of state substantive common law in federal diversity courts).
316 549 S.E.2d 840, 843–45 (N.C. 2001).
317 Id. at 847.
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Amendment challenge on the merits). 318 Had the case been decided by a
federal court exercising federal question jurisdiction over the Fourteenth
Amendment claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims,
the federal court would have decided the state claims in the same way—
dismissing them because of a textual commitment to the Governor. Of
course, regardless of any state law allocation on the state claim, Bacon was
right to adjudicate the Fourteenth Amendment claim on the merits, as a
federal court would have done had the case been brought in federal court
instead.319
Factor 2 cases are somewhat more complicated. Because a state can
authorize its courts to use nonjudicial standards, a state substantive law may
call for the application of nonjudicial standards that would be appropriate for
state courts under state law but outside of Article III’s grant of “judicial”
power to federal courts. Many state constitutions, for example, require the
maintenance of “quality” or “efficient” public schools, or appropriate
financing of them, and state courts largely have held such mandates
justiciable. 320 If those questions would be nonjusticiable in federal court
under Baker Factor 2, 321 then a federal court hearing such a case would

318

Id. at 857.
See, e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 130–31 (1966) (holding that federal courts have
jurisdiction to determine whether a state legislature excluded a member in violation of federal law, even
if the exclusion question would be nonjusticiable in state court under only state law); Larsen v. Senate of
the Commonwealth, 152 F.3d 240, 245–48 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding justiciable, despite state law
committing the question to a coordinate state political branch, a federal law challenge to the state
impeachment process). Some state courts have gotten confused on this point, however. See, e.g., Edington
v. City of Overland Park, 815 P.2d 1116, 1124 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (holding a candidate’s claims that
his nomination to city council was rejected in violation of federal civil rights laws to be nonjusticiable
political questions because the state constitution committed exclusive authority over city council
candidacies to the local government); Carter v. Hamlin Hosp. Dist., 538 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. App.
1976) (holding nonjusticiable an Equal Protection Clause challenge to the drawing of a state hospital
district because district drawing is committed to the discretion of the state legislature); see also Farrington
v. City of Richfield, 488 N.W.2d 13, 16 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (characterizing as having “some merit”
the assertion of the political question doctrine over a claim of nonappointment to city council in violation
of federal civil rights laws). These cases are wrong. While the state political question doctrine might
prevent the state court from resolving state law issues committed to coordinate state governments, state
courts cannot use their political question doctrines to avoid federal law claims that would be justiciable
in federal court. Regardless of the source of the federal political question doctrine, the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause requires state courts to have sufficient jurisdiction to hear federal claims and would
preempt state political question limitations to the contrary. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947)
(holding that state courts must have broad enough jurisdiction to hear federal law claims).
320 For examples of state courts adjudicating the adequacy and efficiency of state schools under state
constitutions, see Columbia Falls Elementary School District. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 260–61
(Mont. 2005), and Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212–13 (Ky. 1989). For
a detailed discussion of state political question considerations of these types of state constitutional
provisions, see Stern, supra note 82, at 192–94.
321 See Stern, supra note 82, at 189–91 (making this argument).
319
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confront standards set by substantive state law that it could not employ under
Article III, and thus the federal court would have to dismiss those claims
under the federal political question doctrine (or potentially certify them to
the state courts).322
In Vincent v. Voight, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
justiciable a challenge to the state’s school-finance system—alleged to have
perpetuated unequal access to financial resources among school districts—
under the Wisconsin constitution’s equal protection clause, 323 which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court treats as equivalent to the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.324 The court held that it
could decide the issues “in the exercise of [its] constitutional role” because
the questions fell within “an area where all three of the co-equal branches of
state government share power and authority consistent with the Wisconsin
Constitution.”325 The court then proceeded to uphold the state system despite
the recognition by Justice Diane Sykes that “[a]ny definition of education or
standard for educational adequacy is inherently a political and policy
question.”326 Had the claim instead been presented to a federal court, the
federal court very well may have had to dismiss for lack of judicially
manageable and discoverable standards as contemplated by Article III.
Another example is Common Cause v. Lewis, a case filed in North
Carolina superior court challenging, on state law grounds, the same North
Carolina partisan gerrymanders at issue in Rucho.327 The state court found
the claims justiciable and, on the merits, held the districts unlawful under
various state constitutional provisions, including North Carolina’s equal
protection clause, 328 which is worded nearly identically to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s.329 The North Carolina state courts employ a test for unlawful
partisan gerrymandering under the state clause akin to the test rejected in
Rucho as too political and not judicial.330 Despite Rucho, the state court held
322 Contra F. Andrew Hessick, Cases, Controversies, and Diversity, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 57, 60–61
(2015) (arguing that federal diversity courts should apply state justiciability rules that would allow
adjudication even when federal justiciability rules would not).
323 See 614 N.W.2d 388, 395–96 (Wis. 2000).
324 Id. at 413 n.26.
325 Id. at 396 n.2.
326 Id. at 429 (Sykes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
327 No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 WL 4569584, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019).
328 See id. at *112–18.
329
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”), with N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“No person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws . . . .”).
330 Compare Lewis, 2019 WL 4569584, at *114 (requiring proof that state officials’ “predominant
purpose” was to entrench partisanship by diluting the votes for their rivals and proof that the lines drawn
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the claim justiciable because of “‘satisfactory and manageable criteria . . .’
for adjudicati[on]” and found that the partisan gerrymander violated the state
equal protection clause.331
Such was the state court’s prerogative under state law. But say the case
had been filed in, or removed to, federal court. Could the federal court
adjudicate, consistent with the federal political question doctrine, the state
claims deemed justiciable in state court? The answer is no, because Rucho
and Article III would prohibit the federal court from applying the state
substantive law’s standards. 332 The political question doctrine’s source—
substantive law—remains the same for state law political questions too.
CONCLUSION
The political question doctrine has long been understood as rooted in
Article III. But that understanding has ambiguous support in the case law and
leads to oddities in application by state courts. Reorienting the political
question doctrine around substantive law is more consistent with the
doctrine’s historical development and helps explain why federal courts
distinguish the political question doctrine from Article III jurisdiction and
why they retain some authority over political question cases. This
reorientation also gives state courts confronting political questions a more
appropriate role and resolves a number of ancillary issues about application
of the doctrine. The result is a more sensible and workable political question
doctrine.

in fact had the intended effect by substantially diluting votes, then shifting the burden to the defendant to
prove that a legitimate, nonpartisan reason justified the map), with Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct.
2484, 2502–03 (2019) (rejecting a “predominant purpose” test).
331 Lewis, 2019 WL 4569584, at *113–18, *127. Other state courts have held similar claims to be
justiciable. See League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 741 (Pa. 2018); League of
Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 416 (Fla. 2015); Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d
712, 717 (Tex. 1991); Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11, 23 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
332 See Harper v. Lewis, No. 5:19-CV-452-FL, 2019 WL 5405279, at *1–3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 22, 2019)
(refusing, under Rucho, to resolve the same state law issues presented in Lewis).
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